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Preface 
 
The issue  
The distribution of formal control rights among the firm’s stakeholders (such as 
stockholders, creditors, employees, politicians, and customers) attracts considerable 
public attention in many countries. For instance, a common view in the UK and the 
US is that firms should have profit maximization as their only objective, and that 
stockholders should be the dominant stakeholder in corporate governance. In contrast, 
conventional wisdom in Continental Europe and Japan is that firms should have 
multiple objectives and allocate formal power to more stakeholder types than just 
stockholders. The politics of corporate governance addresses this issue by regulating 
the owners’ ability to control the corporation.  
 
This report addresses this issue empirically by trying to answer two questions. First, 
what relationship do we actually observe between stakeholder structure and corporate 
behavior? For instance, do firms take less risk when stockholders share control rights 
with employees, customers, and politicians? Second, what is the real-world link 
between stakeholder structure and economic performance? For instance, do ownerless 
firms have lower returns to capital invested than firms owned by stockholders?  
 
 
The sample 
We use firm-level data from the population of Norwegian banks over the period 1985-
2002. These firms have widely different stakeholder structures in terms of how voting 
rights and cash flow rights are distributed between stockholders, employees, 
customers, and politicians. A commercial bank (forretningsbank) has profit 
maximization as its goal, stockholders have all the cash flow rights, and stockholders 
control the board. In contrast, no stakeholder has any cash flow right in the ownerless 
savings bank (sparebank), which has multiple objectives and voting rights shared by 
employees, customers, and politicians. The third type, which we call PCC bank 
(grunnfondsbank), is partly an ownerless, pure savings bank controlled by non-owner 
stakeholders without cash flow rights, partly a pure stock company controlled by 
stockholders with full cash flow rights. 
 
 
Predictions and findings 
Due to the difference in stakeholder structures, we predict that compared to 
commercial banks, ownerless savings banks will (i) be less risky, (ii) be smaller, 
charge higher prices, and grow less, and (iii) be less profitable. The corresponding 
characteristics of PCC banks will fall somewhere in between the two pure types. 
 
Consistent with the first two predictions, we find that compared to owner-controlled 
commercial banks, ownerless savings banks (i) have less risky balance sheets. 
Moreover, they (ii) are smaller and price their products less aggressively, although the 
growth rates are not significantly different. Such behaviour is as expected when 
stakeholders use their control rights to make the firm behave in ways they prefer. 
 
Inconsistent with hypothesis (iii), however, we find that commercial banks do 
not outperform ownerless savings banks in economic terms. In fact, commercial banks 
  ii
sometimes underperform significantly, both statistically and economically. Thus, 
ownerless firms with multiple objectives perform at least as well as profit-oriented 
firms owned by stockholders. This finding questions the critical role of owners 
posited by agency theory, but supports the idea that the disciplining effect of product 
market competition substitutes for ownership. The evidence also suggests that 
stockholders may benefit economically from internalizing welfare effects of their 
actions on other stakeholders, such as employees, customers, and the local 
community. 
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1. Introduction 
The distribution of control rights among the firm’s stakeholders attracts considerable 
public attention in many countries. For instance, a common view in the UK and the 
US is that firms should have long-term profit maximization as their objective, and that 
stockholders should be the dominant stakeholder in corporate governance (Macey and 
O’Hara, 2003). In contrast, conventional wisdom in Continental Europe and Japan is 
that firms should have multiple goals and allocate formal power to more stakeholder 
types than just stockholders (Allen et al., 2006). The politics of corporate governance 
addresses these concerns through regulatory restrictions on the stockholders’ ability to 
control the corporation, such as laws and codes on management’s fiduciary duties, 
independence and diversity in the boardroom, and the control rights of employees.  
Our paper addresses the stakeholder issue empirically by trying to answer two 
questions. First, what relationship is actually observed between stakeholder structure 
and corporate behavior? For instance, do firms take less risk when stockholders share 
control rights with employees, customers, and politicians? Second, what is the real-
world link between stakeholder structure and economic performance? For instance, do 
ownerless firms have lower returns to capital invested than firms owned by 
stockholders? We answer these two questions using firm-level data from the 
population of Norwegian banks over the period 1985-2002. These firms differ widely 
in how formal power is distributed between owners, employees, customers, and the 
local community. For instance, one firm type has profit maximization as its goal, 
stockholders have all the residual cash flow rights, and stockholders control the board. 
In contrast, no stakeholder has cash flow rights in the ownerless firm type, which has 
multiple objectives and voting rights shared by employees, customers, and politicians. 
Hansmann (1996) provides a useful theoretical framework for understanding 
how stakeholder structures drive organizational design. However, this issue is 
remarkably underexplored empirically. First, the focus is not on how stakeholder 
structure relates to economic performance, but how it relates to behavioral 
characteristics, such as productive efficiency (Mester, 1991), pricing strategy (Ashton 
and Letza, 2003; Cummins et al, 2004), risk taking behavior (Esty, 1997a, 1997b), 
cost minimization (Mester, 1989), and corporate governance activity (Crespi et al, 
2004). Second, the stakeholder structures of the analyzed firms have been quite 
homogenous. For instance, with only one exception (Crespi et al, 2004), all firms have 
at least one stakeholder type with both cash flow rights and voting rights, such as 
equity investors in regular stock companies, depositors in S&Ls, policy-holders in 
insurance mutuals, and producers in cooperatives. Thus, this literature has barely 
addressed ownerless firms, which according to Hansmann (1996) are firms where no 
stakeholder has residual cash flow rights, being “barred from distributing any profits 
to its members, officers, directors or trustees” (Hansmann, 1996, p. 228). It seems 
difficult to determine whether ownership is critical for economic organization unless 
one can compare owned firms to ownerless firms. 
We study how organizational form relates to behavior and performance in a 
sample that includes extreme combinations of corporate objectives and owner control, 
and which  all operate in the same product market and the same regulatory regime. 
This large heterogeneity in the determinant of interest and the large homogeneity in 
other determinants increase the power of our tests. In particular, if the key to 
economic success involves profit maximization as a goal and stockholder control as a 
governance mechanism, this should at least show up as performance differences 
between firms that operate in the same environment, but that represent the largest 
possible difference in objectives and owner control. 
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The first firm type is pure savings banks (sparebank), which are ownerless 
foundations controlled by depositors, employees, and the local government.1 Thus, 
these are not collectively owned mutuals, but genuinely ownerless enterprises where 
no stakeholder has cash flow rights. The second type is commercial banks 
(forretningsbank), which are pure stock companies owned and controlled by 
stockholders and listed on the stock exchange. The third type, which we call PCC 
bank (grunnfondsbank), is a mixture of the two pure types. A PCC bank has 
voluntarily transformed itself from a pure savings bank (hereafter non-PCC bank) into 
a hybrid form by issuing primary capital certificates (hence PCC). These contracts are 
equity securities held by the general public and are normally listed. Thus, a PCC bank 
is partly an ownerless, pure savings bank controlled by non-owner stakeholders 
without cash flow rights, partly a pure stock company controlled by stockholders with 
full cash flow rights. 
Given these differences in stakeholder structure, it is not surprising that the 
shape of the objective function varies across the three organizational forms. 
Commercial banks have profit maximization as their goal, whereas non-PCC banks 
have multiple goals.2 PCC banks also have multiple goals, but the objective function 
is different than in non-PCC banks because PCC banks also have stockholders with 
cash flow rights and voting rights. 
The literature gives some hints as to how our sample firms may behave and 
perform. First, economic theory shows that the combination of profit maximization 
and stockholder control is Pareto optimal in a competitive equilibrium, provided 
security markets are perfect and complete, information is symmetric, and agency costs 
are zero. Second, introducing imperfections into this idealized Arrow-Debreu 
economy means that theory has considerably less to say about efficient combinations 
of corporate objectives and corporate governance. Ignoring the question of Pareto 
optimality and assuming zero agency costs, Allen et al. (2006) show that shareholder 
concern for other objectives than profit maximization will influence the firm’s 
behaviour. For instance, firms with controlling stockholders who start internalizing 
their employee’s private layoff costs in the firm’s objective function will change 
behaviour in equilibrium by taking on less risk, producing less output, and charging 
higher prices. Third, extant bank research (Karceski et al (2005) is a recent example) 
has shown theoretically and empirically that information asymmetry between lenders 
and borrowers makes banking relationships valuable for customers beyond the value 
of a single transaction. Thus, terminating a banking relationship and starting a new 
one is costly, particularly for small firms. Also, growing banks tend to reduce the 
supply of funds available to small firms.  
This suggests that in our context, local authorities protecting the local 
economy and bank customers protecting their banking relationship will use their 
control rights to influence the strategy of savings banks in general and of non-PCC 
banks in particular. This will materialize itself as a pressure on management to choose 
a low risk strategy in order to avoid bank distress, and to go for modest growth that 
enables local, small businesses to keep their bank relationship. According to Allen et 
                                                 
1 This organizational form is similar to mutual savings banks in the US, which are ownerless 
foundations established for the first time in 1816. They should not be confused with S&Ls, which are 
consumer cooperatives owned by their depositors (Hansmann, 1996, pp. 246-252). 
2 Other goals include promoting saving in society and offering bank services to as many citizens as 
possible. Savings banks also distribute part of their earnings for social purposes. Non-PCCs (PCCs) 
allocated 4% (1%) of net income to gifts over the sample period. We do not have the corresponding 
figure for commercial banks, but we believe they allocate substantially less than savings banks. 
  3
al, 2006), the tendency for stakeholder-oriented firms to charge higher prices will also 
produce higher interest margins in savings banks than in commercial banks. Thus, the 
bank’s stakeholder structure will influence the characteristics of the income statement 
as well as the composition and dynamics of the balance sheet. As for performance, the 
agency logic suggests that commercial banks will produce higher average returns for a 
given risk than savings banks. This is because owners have a valuable monitoring role 
and because concern for non-owner objectives is costly for the owners. 
On this background, we conjecture that compared to commercial banks, 
ownerless savings banks will (i) be less risky, (ii) be smaller, charge higher prices, 
and grow less, and (iii) be less profitable. The corresponding characteristics of PCC 
banks will fall somewhere in between the two pure types. Consistent with the first two 
predictions, we find that compared to owner-controlled commercial banks, ownerless 
savings banks (i) have less risky balance sheets. Moreover, they (ii) are smaller and 
price their products less aggressively, although the growth rates are not significantly 
different. 
Inconsistent with prediction (iii), we find that commercial banks do not 
outperform ownerless savings banks in economic terms.3 In fact, commercial banks 
sometimes underperform significantly, both in statistical and economic terms. This 
puzzling result does not imply that shareholders produce no value beyond just 
providing financing. However, it does suggest that owners are redundant in the sense 
that ownership is not an irreplaceable corporate governance mechanism. Other 
mechanisms do the job at least as efficiently. In particular, successful ownerless firms 
have disciplining mechanisms that substitute for the monitoring and advice functions 
of capital providers. These mechanisms are endogenous responses to exogenous 
factors in the firm’s environment.  
Three exogenous factors seem particularly relevant. First, the public banking 
supervisor monitors all banks according to the same rules on a regular basis. 
However, banking supervisors barely fill the role of monitoring stockholders because 
they focus on limiting downside risk rather than encouraging maximum value 
creation. A second factor is that although there is no owner to monitor managers of a 
non-PCC bank, management cannot easily overinvest. This is because an ownerless 
bank cannot raise outside equity. We find no evidence supporting this explanation. 
Moreover, even if we had found such evidence, which suggest the agency problem is 
taken care of by the capital constraint, this cannot explain why multiple-objective 
firms still make at least as profitable investments as firms with profit-maximization as 
the single goal. Thus, even if non-PCC banks were capital constrained in ways that 
prevented investment in projects with negative NPV for stockholders, why would 
their managers use the restricted equity on projects with the most positive NPV?  
This question brings us to the third exogenous disciplining device, which is 
the need to perform well when product markets are competitive. The logic is simply 
that regardless of how control rights are distributed, only efficient firms survive in 
competitive markets (Machlup, 1967; Scharfstein, 1988; Schmidt, 1997). We provide 
some evidence that this is the more probable explanation for our finding. That is, 
firms without owners survive in markets when they respond to competitive pressure in 
ways they would have done in a market with less competition, but with monitoring 
owners. Active ownership and strong competition are substitute governance 
mechanisms.  
                                                 
3 As expected, the hybrid PCC banks fall in between the two pure types on both behavior and 
performance. 
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Finally, the three bank types have coexisted in our sample over extended 
periods of time. This may suggest there is no universally dominant type and that the 
value of ownership relative to other ways of organizing enterprise depends on a wider 
set of stakeholder, firm, and market characteristics than those explored in our project. 
In fact, the theoretical literature surveyed by Hansmann (1996) shows that ownerless 
firms may be both sustainable and optimal, that viable owned firms may have an 
ownership structure that does not involve the firm’s capital providers at all, and that 
ownership by other stakeholders such as customers and employees is more efficient 
the stronger the firm’s market power over these stakeholders, the more firm-specific 
the human capital, and the less symmetric the information between the parties. 
We conclude that the stakeholder structure drives the firm’s behavior in the 
direction predicted by theory and existing empirical evidence. In contrast, the 
observed relationship between stakeholder structure and economic performance is 
inconsistent with agency theory. This suggests there is a serious challenger to the 
classic organizational form of enterprise assigning the control rights to stockholders in 
profit-maximizing firms. Neither one-dimensional profit-maximization nor the 
stockholders’ monitoring of management seems critical for  value creation. As for  
objectives, Allen et al. (2006) show formally that in a model without agency costs, the 
return to capital invested may increase when controlling shareholders voluntarily let 
the firm’s objective function reflect the welfare of non-capitalist stakeholders, such as 
customers and employees. As for monitoring, an open question we leave for the 
theorist is whether the Allen et al. result still holds with agency conflicts.  
 The rest of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
and presents our predictions, and the third section describes the data set and the 
overall development of the Norwegian banking industry during the sample period 
1985-2002. We analyze the banks’ behavior in section 4, whereas economic 
performance is explored in section 5. Summary and conclusions follow in section 6. 
Supplementary tables are provided in the appendix. 
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2. Theory 
According to the theory of the firm, the distribution of control rights may influence 
the firm’s behavior and performance both through its objective function and its 
corporate governance system. The objective function channel is evident when 
multiple stakeholder types share the control rights. For instance, employee directors 
may be more willing than shareholder directors to sacrifice profits in order to increase 
job security. Even when all control rights belong to one stakeholder type, however, 
such as the shareholders in most corporations, the objective function will depend on 
how the controlling stakeholder handles externalities faced by other stakeholders. For 
instance, ethical mutual funds may focus more than other stockholders on whether the 
firm they own is employing, producing, and pricing in socially acceptable ways.  
The firm’s governance system is considered particularly important when 
control rights are delegated to management. The principal-agent paradigm argues that 
firms in competitive markets will underperform and eventually disappear unless they 
have monitors who actively discipline opportunistic managers in ways that foster 
economic efficiency. According to this logic, owners matter not only because they 
finance the investments. Stockholders who delegate control can also monitor 
management and thereby ensure they make decisions that maximize the value of the 
capital supplied. Hence, monitoring is considered a valuable corporate governance 
mechanism, and firms where stockholders have weak control rights are disadvantaged 
compared to firms where stockholders are stronger. Moreover, the agency framework 
suggests that conflicts of interest between stakeholder types will produce lower 
returns to capital invested in firms with multiple objectives than in firms with profit 
maximization as the only goal.  
Tirole (2001) takes the agency model one step further by keeping the 
separation between ownership and control, but allowing for multiple stakeholder 
types. Thus, power may not only reside with owners and managers, but also with 
customers, employees, politicians, and society at large. This means the firm’s 
objective function may reflect the preferences of several stakeholder types. In such a 
context, maximization of returns to capital invested may no longer be the dominating 
concern, monitoring by owners may be a less critical governance mechanism, and 
ownerless firms may survive. 
Table 1 shows how control (voting) rights and cash flow rights are distributed 
among the four stakeholder types in our sample firms. The non-PCC bank has a 
committee of representatives with members appointed by the employees (25% of the 
votes), depositors (37.5%), and local authorities (37.5%). This committee elects the 
board, and the two bodies jointly hire and fire the CEO. Since no  stakeholder has 
cash flow rights, this is genuinely an ownerless firm. In contrast, commercial banks 
have owners who write the corporate charter, elect two thirds of the firm’s directors in 
the stockholder meeting, and have a 100% claim on the residual cash flow.4 Finally, 
holders of PCC securities are owners, but have only a fractional claim on the residual 
cash flow corresponding to their share of the bank’s equity, which varies between 5% 
and 90%. Their voting right is 25% by law, which means they elect 25% of the 
committee of representatives. In every other respect, PCC securities give the same 
ownership rights as regular shares. Notice, however, that because the PCC capital is 
                                                 
4 Commercial banks with more than 200 employees are required by law to have one third of their 
directors elected by and among the firm’s employees. All commercial banks in our sample have more 
than 200 employees. 
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senior to the remaining, ownerless equity, PCC securities are less risky than the equity 
of an otherwise identical commercial bank. 
 
Table 1: Control rights and cash flow rights across stakeholder types  
 Control right, %   
Bank type 
Stock-
holders Employees Depositors Community 
 Cash flow 
right, % 
Non-PCC  0 25 37.5 37.5 Nobody 
PCC  25 25 25 25 
Stockholders: 
5-90 
Commercial 67 33 0 0 
Stockholders: 
100 
The table shows the distribution of control rights and cash flow rights in Norwegian non-
PCC banks, PCC banks, and commercial banks. Non-PCC banks are ownerless foundations 
(pure savings banks). PCC banks used to be pure savings banks that later transformed 
themselves into PCC banks by issuing equity securities to the general public in terms of 
Primary Capital Certificates (PCC).  
 
Our sample consists of banks that operate in the same product market, are 
exposed to the same regulatory regime, and are monitored by the same public banking 
inspector (Kredittilsynet). Because monitoring is assumed to be valuable and because 
of the assumed tradeoff between the interests of owners and other stakeholders, the 
agency perspective predicts that economic performance is lower the weaker the 
owners’ control rights and the more multi-faceted the firm’s objective function. Thus, 
commercial banks will perform best economically, non-PCC banks the least, and PCC 
banks will fall somewhere in between. 
Although Allen et al. (2006) ignore the agency problem, they challenge the 
idea that owners necessarily lose wealth if they internalize other stakeholders’ private 
disutility caused by the firm’s actions, such as search costs for new jobs after a 
corporate bankruptcy. They show formally that such a stakeholder policy may even 
increase the value of the firm. The mechanism by which this happens is that multiple-
objective firms soften competition by charging higher prices and producing less 
volume in equilibrium.5 This positive firm value effect comes more easily if 
regulation dictates social responsibility for all firms (such as mandating employee 
directors) or if consumers are willing to pay more for products from socially 
responsible firms (such as firms that downsize less in recessions).  
In our setting, the Allen et al. (2006) model suggests that compared to 
commercial banks, ownerless non-PCC banks will reduce the externalities of financial 
distress by taking on less risk, with PCC banks in between. We will see shortly that 
the banking literature has made the same predictions and found supporting evidence 
in similar contexts.6  However, only Allen et al. (2006) predict that the return to 
                                                 
5 Since consumers are paying the bill in terms of higher prices, a stakeholder society is not necessarily 
Pareto optimal. Allen et al. (2006) do not address that question. 
6 The risk argument can also be based on the options pricing model (Black and Scholes, 1973), which 
implies that because equity in a leveraged firm is a call option on the underlying assets, higher asset 
volatility increases the value of equity at the expense of other claimholders. Therefore, unlike non-PCC 
banks, a commercial bank may act in its owners’ best interest by increasing the volatility of its cash 
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capital invested may increase if the firm puts more weight on the preferences of non-
owner stakeholders. This difference may be due to the fact that Allen et al. ignore 
costly separation between ownership and control. In fact, Tirole (2001) argues that the 
major governance problem for owners of multiple objective firms is not to trade off 
the interest of multiple stakeholder types ex ante, but to assess decision quality ex 
post. Managers of multiple-objective firms can always argue that although profits was 
mediocre compared to profit-maximizing competitors, the score was better on 
objectives that are expensive to fulfill and hard to evaluate, such as social 
responsibility. We try to shed light on the seriousness of ignoring this monitoring 
problem by testing the predictive power rather than the descriptive accuracy of the 
agency model versus the Allen et al. (2006) model. 
The banking literature offers several insights into how behavior will differ 
across our bank types in terms of observable characteristics like growth, size, and risk 
taking. Banking relationships are valuable for the bank’s customers and particularly 
for small start-up firms with limited access to alternative sources of debt financing. 
This has been shown both theoretically (Campbell, 1979; Fama, 1985; Diamond, 
1991; Rajan, 1992; Boot and Thakor, 1994; von Thadden, 1995; Bhattacharya and 
Chiesa, 1995; Yosha, 1995) and empirically (Slovin et al, 1993; Hubbard et al., 1999; 
Ongena et al., 2003). Moreover, Karceski et al. (2005) document that customers may 
be adversely affected not only when a bank is insolvent, but also when it merges or is 
taken over. Berger and Udell (1996) and Peek and Rosengren (1996) show that as 
banks grow through consolidation, they tend to reduce the supply of loans to small 
businesses.7 Finally, Stein (2002) provides a theoretical explanation for a size effect in 
lending, where large banks lend to large firms and small banks lend to small firms in 
equilibrium.  
Overall, the banking literature suggests that certain customers will benefit 
from dealing with large banks, whereas others will suffer when their bank is big, 
grows fast, merges, or faces financial distress.8 Moreover, a bank’s assets and 
                                                                                                                                            
flow and not simultaneously rewriting the contract with its non-owner stakeholders. Notice, however, 
that although Allen et al. (2006) make the same prediction, the reason is the opposite: Stakeholder 
oriented banks are less risky not because other stakeholders than owners are in control, but because 
controlling owners find it beneficial for the value of their own claim to have low risk. 
7 However, Strahan and Weston (1998) and Berger et al. (1998) show that the supply of funds for small 
businesses may not decrease after a bank merger, provided competing, smaller banks are ready to fill 
the gap. 
8 These arguments are also plausible reason why three different organizational forms coexist in our 
sample According to the classic view, coexistence is infeasible, as the superior organisational form will 
crowd out the others. In some industries, however, the customer value of the product depends on the 
survival of the supplier after the purchase. This value is particularly relevant in the financial industry, 
where switching costs will make some customers benefit more than others from a bank with smaller 
default risk, lower chance of being taken over, smaller size, and slower growth. These characteristics 
correspond to those of ownerless savings banks as opposed to commercial banks in our sample. 
However, the control right in savings banks is illiquid, since it is tied to the customer status. Customers 
must be compensated for this illiquidity, and Remmers (2003) hypothesizes that the cost of capital will 
be higher in savings banks than commercial banks. 
On the other hand, a commercial bank is problematic for the customer because its owners have 
post-contract incentives to increase the risk at their customers’ expense. In order to induce customers to 
still purchase their product, owners in the Remmers model contract with the manager to limit the 
bank’s risk taking. Hence, unlike savings banks, commercial banks incur contracting costs between 
owners and managers. For the same reason, commercial banks must offer lower prices.  
Thus, Remmers predicts that coexistence may exist in equilibrium. Compared to owner-
controlled banks, banks with weaker owner control will have lower contracting costs, higher costs of 
capital, and charge higher prices. 
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liabilities are unusually liquid because they can be shifted substantially over a short 
time period at low adjustment costs. Thus, Esty (1997a) argues that differences in 
stakeholder structure will make balance sheets differ both across bank types and also 
within the same bank over time. Esty (1997b) documents that when his sample of 
depositor-owned S&Ls in the US convert to stockholder-owned commercial banks, 
their asset and liability structures change considerably. In particular, banks grow 
faster and take on more risk after having transformed to a stockholder-owned type. 
Summarizing, we conjecture that compared to commercial banks, ownerless 
savings banks have less risk, are smaller, and grow more slowly. PCC banks are 
somewhere in between the two pure types. In an agency setting, risk-adjusted returns 
to capital invested will be lowest in ownerless banks, highest in commercial banks, 
with PCC banks in between. If the corporate governance problem is better handled by 
firms with multiple objectives and by other disciplining mechanisms than monitoring 
stockholders, performance is no longer positively related to the fraction of control 
rights and cash flow rights held by stockholders. 
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3. The Norwegian banking industry 
The first Norwegian savings bank was established in 1822, while the first commercial 
bank was founded in 1848. Regulation introduced in 1985 opened up for PCC banks, 
and the first such bank was established in 1988 when a pure savings bank (non-PCC 
bank) chose to become a PCC bank. 
Our data set includes every Norwegian savings bank (non-PCC and PCC) and 
all listed Norwegian commercial banks from1985 to 2002.9 There are 2668 firm years 
altogether, of which 2288, 214, and 166 are for non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and 
commercial banks, respectively.10 As shown by table 2, there is a monotonic decline 
in the total number of banks, commercial banks, savings banks as a group (non-PCC 
banks plus PCC banks) and non-PCC banks. For instance, the number of non-PCC 
banks and commercial banks drops from 191 to 103 and from 15 to 2, respectively. 
The opposite pattern is evident for PCC banks, as the number increases from 3 in 
1988 to 24 in 2002. From 1994 on, there are more PCC banks than commercial banks. 
Norwegian banks went through a systemic crisis in the period 1988-1992 
(Moe et al. (2004) provide a review). The first bank failure occurred in the fall of 
1988, and 13 small and medium sized banks failed in 1988–1990.11 By the end of 
1990 large commercial banks were in trouble as well. The government established a 
bank insurance fund to finance distressed banks. To qualify for government support, 
strict criteria had to be met which sometimes involved a write-off of the existing share 
capital. This system brought the three largest Norwegian commercial banks under full 
state ownership in 1992.  
The banking industry regained profitability in 1993, and the state gradually 
reduced its ownership. By the end of our sample period, the state held a minority stake 
(47.8%) in the largest commercial bank and had sold all their shares in the two 
others.12
                                                 
9 Unlisted commercial banks are either operating as independent units (like the former Postbanken), as 
part of a financial conglomerate (like Storebrand Bank), or as a subsidiary of a multinational banking 
group (like Handelsbanken). 
10 Accounting data for commercial banks and stock market data for commercial banks and PCC banks 
was collected in electronic form from Oslo Børs Informasjon, which is the information provider of the 
Oslo Stock Exchange. Accounting data for non-PCC banks and PCC banks was obtained from 
Sparebankenes Sikringsfond, to which all savings banks must report their annual accounting figures 
once a year. We received these data electronically for 1987-1991 and for 1995-2002, while we 
collected data from printouts provided by Sparebankenes Sikringsfond for the remaining years (1985-
1986, 1992-1994). These printouts were scanned electronically and then verified manually.  
11 Nine savings banks and two commercial banks received guarantees from the banks’ insurance funds 
and were forced to merge with solvent banks. One merged savings bank received government support 
though loans and debt write-offs from the central bank. One commercial bank (Norion Bank) was 
allowed to liquidate, but all depositors’ claims were covered. 
12 Table 1 document that our sample period contains two consolidation periods for commercial banks. 
The number of such banks dropped around 1990 and again just before 2000. In the former period 
struggling banks merged or were acquired by solvent banks during the systemic crisis (DnC merged 
with Bergens Bank, whereas Sunnmørsbanken and Sørlandsbanken were acquired by CBK) In the 
latter period some banks were acquired by or merged into multinational financial groups (for instance, 
CBK merged into Nordea, which is a pan-Nordic financial conglomerate, Fokus was acquired by 
Danske Bank, which is Danish, and Bergens Skillingsbank was acquired by the Swedish bank 
Handelsbanken). Other banks were involved in domestic M&As (e.g., Finansbanken was acquired by 
Storebrand, which is a Norwegian insurance company moving into banking). The savings bank 
industry has been consolidating more gradually.  
The declining number of banks in table 1 reflects the growing industry concentration among 
Norwegian banks over time. The Herfindahl index of total assets rises from 8% to 18% for the sector as 
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Table 2: The number of Norwegian banks over the period 1985-2002 
   Savings banks 
Year 
All    
banks 
Commercial 
banks All Non-PCC PCC 
Listed 
PCC 
1985 206 15 191 191   
1986 206 16 190 190   
1987 172 13 159 159   
1988 173 14 159 156 3 0 
1989 158 14 144 137 7 4 
1990 154 10 144 137 7 3 
1991 147 11 136 128 8 4 
1992 145 11 134 125 9 4 
1993 142 10 132 124 8 4 
1994 141 9 132 122 10 8 
1995 140 8 132 118 14 12 
1996 141 8 133 117 16 13 
1997 137 7 130 114 16 14 
1998 137 7 130 109 21 19 
1999 134 4 130 107 23 20 
2000 135 4 131 107 24 22 
2001 132 3 129 105 24 22 
2002 129 2 127 103 24 22 
The table shows the total number of Norwegian banks (All banks), the number of listed 
commercial banks, savings banks (All, non-PCC banks and PCC banks), and listed PCC 
banks. Non-PCC banks are ownerless foundations (pure savings banks). PCC banks used 
to be pure savings banks that later transformed themselves into PCC banks by issuing 
equity securities to the general public in terms of Primary Capital Certificates (PCC). 
The first PCC bank was established in 1988. 
 
Table 3 shows total bank assets across organizational form over the years. Non-PCC 
savings bank assets declined sharply in 1988. This drop was not primarily because of 
the crisis, but because three rather large savings banks issued PCC securities. As more 
banks converted, non-PCC assets continued declining to a bottom of NOK118 billion 
in 1995. Since then, there has been a steady growth to NOK182 billion in 2002, which 
reflects a real, annual growth of 6% in this most current seven-year period. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
a whole, from 6% to 14% for savings banks, and from 21% to 85% for commercial banks. Since this 
period experienced a significant influx of foreign banks into the Norwegian market, the declining 
number of nationally domiciled banks does not necessarily imply that competition in the banking 
market was declining. 
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Table 3: The size of the Norwegian banking industry 
 All Commercial Savings banks 
Year banks banks All Non-PCC PCC 
1985 653 376 276 276  
1986 782 471 311 311  
1987 951 542 409 409  
1988 925 537 388 259 129 
1989 928 579 348 199 149 
1990 925 589 336 197 139 
1991 858 551 307 143 164 
1992 816 517 299 134 165 
1993 775 469 307 138 169 
1994 776 456 320 121 199 
1995 792 456 336 118 219 
1996 921 549 372 124 248 
1997 996 585 411 133 278 
1998 1051 603 448 131 317 
1999 1147 619 528 138 389 
2000 1258 665 593 159 434 
2001 1083 440 642 169 473 
2002 1113 432 680 182 499 
Average 931 524 406 186 265 
We measures size by the book value of assets in constant billion NOK as of 2002. 
One NOK is approximately 0.15 Euros. Average size in the bottom row is based 
on the pooled sample. Non-PCC banks are ownerless foundations (pure savings 
banks). PCC banks used to be pure savings banks that later transformed 
themselves into PCC banks by issuing equity securities to the general public in 
terms of Primary Capital Certificates (PCC). 
 
PCC asset totaled NOK185 billion in the introduction year of 1988. Except for 
one small decline in the crisis year 1990, there has been a steady, annual growth of 
11% per year from NOK139 billion in 1990 to NOK499 billion in 2002. The 
commercial bank sector grew until 1990, thereafter declining to its minimum in 1994 
as a result of the banking crisis. The subsequent growth period reached a top in 2000 
with NOK665 billion, after a 6.5 % annual growth.13 
Comparing the relative size of the three organizational forms, table 3 reveals 
that although the commercial bank sector is largest in the beginning of the sample 
period and the savings bank sector is largest in the end, the overall market share of the 
two in terms of total assets is still fairly equal over the sample period. There is a 
strong tendency within the savings banks sector for the non-PCCs to lose market share 
to the PCCs. For instance, whereas assets in PCCs were just half the assets in non-
PCCs in 1988, PCC assets were almost three times higher in 2002. 
                                                 
13 When CBK was acquired by the international bank Nordea in 2001, one third of commercial bank 
assets left our sample. 
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Internationally, it turns out that Germany (Krahnen and Schmidt, 2004) and 
Spain (Crespi et al, 2004) are the two other European countries where savings banks 
have a prevalent position, accounting for roughly half of total bank assets. However, 
important differences exist. German savings banks are owned by local governments, 
only Norway and Spain have ownerless savings banks (non-PCCs), and only Norway 
has PCC banks. 
Allen et al. (2006) predict that stakeholder firms (non-PCC and PCC banks in 
our context) will compete more softly than shareholder firms (commercial banks). 
Figure 1 shows that interest rates offered on deposits by the banks in our sample do 
not differ noticeably between bank types. However, the table also documents that 
lending rates are higher in savings banks.14 Thus, the interest rate margin (lending rate 
minus savings rate) is higher in stakeholder-oriented firms, which is consistent with 
the Allen et al. prediction. 
 Allen et al. also hypothesize that as some firms switch from a stakeholder 
structure towards more concern for stockholders, competition will be tougher, and 
prices will fall. Figure 2 suggests that this may have happened in our sample as non-
PCC banks became PCC banks. The average interest rate margin is steadily 
decreasing over the period, independently of the general level of interest rates. There 
are several competing explanations, like technology improvement, better price 
transparency, and increased competition from foreign and domestic entrants.15 Still, 
we cannot rule out the effect on interest rates of a shift from broader stakeholder 
concerns to a narrower stockholder focus. Unfortunately, we do not have pricing data 
at the individual bank level to investigate the pricing issue more formally. 
 
 
                                                 
14 One explanation might be that since savings banks are smaller, they offer smaller loans that in 
general are more expensive only due fixed handling costs, and not to any difference in pricing policy. 
15 Internet banking was introduced towards the end of the sample period with the first pure internet 
bank (Skandiabanken) opening in 2000. Comparative surveys of lending and deposit rates appeared in 
the media early in the sample period, and foreign banks started entering the Norwegian market around 
the same time.  
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Figure 1: Interest rates on home building loans and ordinary deposits offered by Norwegian banks 1992-2002 
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Figure 2: Interest rate level and interest rate margin in Norwegian banks 1985-2005 
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Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for size per bank. Because the mean is 
always above the median, all distributions are skewed to the right, reflecting that each 
type has a few banks that are atypically large. Focusing on median size, the table 
shows that on average, a commercial bank is roughly five times larger than a PCC 
bank, which in turn is twelve times the size of a pure savings bank. Apparently, 
median size has grown much more strongly in commercial banks than in savings 
banks of either type. However, the decline in the median PCC bank in the table does 
not mean that existing PCCs became smaller. It is due to the fact that the first non-
PCC savings banks that converted were much larger than the subsequent converters. 
Thus, if we instead follow each individual bank over time, we find that the average 
annual growth is 12.2% for commercial banks, 12.6% for PCC banks16 and 10.3% for 
non-PCC banks. The differences between these averages are not statistically 
significant. 
To summarize this section, the Norwegian banking industry consists of 
commercial banks and savings banks, and a savings bank is either a PCC bank or a 
non-PCC bank. The relative size of the commercial bank and the savings bank sectors 
stays roughly equal over the sample period 1985-2002. On average, the median 
commercial bank is five times the size of a PCC bank, which is turn is twelve times 
larger than a non-PCC bank. The concentration of the banking industry increases over 
time, as the number of listed commercial banks drops from 15 to 2, and the number of 
non-PCC banks falls from 191 to 103. The latter decline is partially driven by non-
PCCs that transform themselves into PCCs. The first PCC bank was established in 
1988, the number grows steadily to 24 in 2002, and the aggregate size of PCC banks 
exceeds that of non-PCC banks from 1991 on. Asset growth per bank is somewhat 
larger in commercial banks than in pure savings banks, and the average PCC bank 
grows slightly faster than commercials. Although we lack sufficiently detailed data 
for formal tests, we find supporting evidence of the Allen et al. (2006) prediction that 
closer attention to multiple stakeholders makes the firm compete in a softer way. 
 
                                                 
16 Excluding the switching year, in which PCC banks may have a particularly high growth, the average 
PCC growth rate drops from 12.6% to 12.1%. 
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Table 4: Size per bank 
Non-PCC PCC Commercial 
Year Min Max Mean Std Med Min Max Mean Std Med Min Max Mean Std Med 
1985 0.01 57.2 1.4 4.7 0.4      0.94 107.6 25.1 37.9 9.2 
1986 0.01 65.8 1.6 5.3 0.4      1.25 138.0 29.5 47.0 9.9 
1987 0.02 120.8 2.6 11.1 0.5      2.02 158.6 41.7 57.0 11.5 
1988 0.02 27.2 1.7 4.2 0.5 2.62 114.1 43.0 50.5 12.3 1.91 166.9 38.4 52.2 11.6 
1989 0.02 26.4 1.5 3.8 0.6 0.82 103.1 21.3 33.9 10.6 1.67 179.3 41.4 57.3 11.5 
1990 0.02 25.1 1.4 3.7 0.5 0.81 97.6 19.9 32.1 8.4 2.36 257.7 58.9 88.2 20.4 
1991 0.02 19.3 1.1 2.2 0.6 0.81 91.1 20.5 27.7 13.0 4.03 251.0 50.1 77.6 14.7 
1992 0.02 17.4 1.1 2.0 0.6 0.23 90.3 18.3 26.7 10.1 4.02 235.4 47.0 74.1 12.5 
1993 0.02 16.6 1.1 2.0 0.6 0.83 92.6 21.1 28.1 14.5 1.76 198.0 46.9 67.4 19.7 
1994 0.02 10.7 1.0 1.4 0.6 0.80 95.4 19.9 26.5 15.0 6.75 186.5 50.7 65.4 28.2 
1995 0.02 11.3 1.0 1.5 0.6 0.03 98.4 15.6 24.6 4.5 6.89 195.5 57.0 71.2 26.2 
1996 0.02 12.2 1.1 1.7 0.7 0.07 114.3 15.5 27.1 3.4 9.18 220.8 68.6 84.9 30.4 
1997 0.02 13.5 1.2 1.8 0.7 0.07 131.4 17.4 31.1 4.0 11.88 257.9 83.5 103.9 27.7 
1998 0.02 14.7 1.2 1.9 0.8 0.07 144.3 15.1 30.7 3.8 13.97 272.0 86.2 107.0 29.9 
1999 0.03 16.7 1.3 2.1 0.8 0.08 188.7 16.9 38.3 4.4 23.33 338.5 154.8 154.9 128.7 
2000 0.08 18.4 1.5 2.4 0.9 0.10 201.5 18.1 40.3 4.7 25.77 361.0 166.2 166.1 139.1 
2001 0.09 19.8 1.6 2.5 1.0 0.11 221.9 19.7 44.2 5.0 29.60 375.6 146.8 198.2 35.1 
2002 0.10 21.0 1.8 2.7 1.1 0.13 235.0 20.8 46.7 5.4 36.61 395.8 216.2 254.0 216.2 
Average 0.03 28.6 1.4 3.2 0.7 0.50 134.6 20.2 33.9 7.9 10.2 238.7 78.3 98.0 43.5 
For every year and bank type, the table reports the minimum and maximum size, the mean size, the standard deviation, and the median size 
per bank. Size is measured by the book value of assets in constant (2002)  billion NOK. Non-PCC banks are ownerless foundations (pure 
savings banks). PCC banks used to be pure savings banks that later transformed themselves into PCC banks by issuing equity securities to 
the general public in terms of  Primary Capital Certificates (PCC). 
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4. Stakeholder structure and balance sheet characteristics 
Based on the idea that the distribution of control rights drives the firm’s decisions and 
the fact that a bank’s assets and liabilities have low adjustment costs, this section 
explores the relationship between bank type and the balance sheet composition. We 
start with simple descriptive statistics showing how the balance sheet differs across 
the three bank types. Estimates from a logit model presented towards the end of the 
section generally confirm the impression from the descriptive statistics. 
4.1 Assets 
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for the asset structure across bank types. We 
divide total assets into the seven categories of fixed assets, down-payment contracts, 
short-term assets, overdraft facilities, building loans, other loans, and losses.17 Using a 
bank’s total assets as weights, all averages in the table are value-weighted. 
The interest earned is lower on downpayment contracts than on overdraft 
facilities and building loans. This difference reflects riskiness and handling costs. 
Consumers mainly demand mortgages for their downpayment contracts, which 
reduces the risk and the interest rate. Business loans are generally more risky and pay 
a higher average return.  
A bank wanting to increase the expected return may shift some assets away 
from downpayment contracts to more risky instruments. This will produce a higher 
interest rate margin and higher asset risk. Given the stakeholder structure, we expect 
to find the highest fraction of downpayment contracts in non-PCCs, while PCCs and 
commercials have more of its assets in the more risky asset classes towards the right 
in the table. 
Table 5 shows that downpayment contracts constitute the largest component of 
the assets for all bank types and all years, and that its relative importance increases 
over time with few exceptions.18 Consistent with our stakeholder based risk argument, 
the average fraction of downpayments is higher in savings banks (about 75%) than 
commercial banks (49%), and consistently higher in non-PCCs than in PCCs after 
1997.  
Short-term assets constitute the second largest assets component for every 
bank type. As an average over time, investments in short-term assets are slightly more 
common in commercial banks (21% vs. 17%). However, its relative importance tends 
to grow after the mid-1990s in commercial banks and PCC banks. In contrast, non-
PCC banks reduce the relative holdings of short-term assets almost every year.  
                                                 
17 Short-term assets include cash, loans to the central bank, loans to other financial institutions, short-
term bonds, and shares in non-associated companies with less than a 20% ownership stake. Down-
payment contracts are loans where the principal is gradually paid back, such as mortgages. Other loans 
are all loans not fitting into any other category, such as factoring, leasing, and credit cards. Fixed assets 
include real estate, long-term bonds and shares representing at least 20% ownership. Losses is the 
actual loss in the period plus increased allowances made for expected future losses.  
18 The low figures for the two first sample years in commercial banks is due to a classification system 
which allocated most downpayment contracts to other loans category. 
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Table 5: Asset structure for the three bank types 
Fixed assets 
Downpayment 
contracts Short-term assets
Overdraft 
facilities Building loans Other loans Losses 
Year 
Non-
PCC PCC Com 
Non-
PCC PCC Com
Non-
PCC PCC Com
Non-
PCC PCC Com 
Non-
PCC PCC Com
Non-
PCC PCC Com
Non-
PCC PCC Com
1985 2.7  4.1 57.5  0.6 29.4  29.8 7.1  12.8 5.6  4.3 -  50.6 -2.3  -2.1
1986 2.8  3.8 62.1  3.9 24.4  28.5 7.6  12.4 5.5  4.2 -  49.0 -2.3  -1.9
1987 2.8  4.0 60.5  32.6 24.4  29.3 8.8  12.3 5.7  3.9 0.0  19.3 -2.2  -1.4
1988 3.2 2.1 4.3 62.2 59.7 40.3 21.2 24.7 21.9 8.6 9.0 11.4 5.2 5.7 4.2 1.9 0.2 19.4 -2.3 -1.4 -1.5
1989 3.1 2.4 4.2 64.7 65.3 45.2 21.6 19.2 19.7 7.4 9.6 9.0 3.9 5.1 3.0 1.6 0.3 20.3 -2.3 -1.9 -1.5
1990 2.7 2.7 4.1 68.5 71.0 46.4 20.5 16.2 20.3 6.9 7.5 7.7 3.2 4.0 3.0 0.3 - 19.7 -2.1 -1.4 -1.3
1991 2.6 2.6 3.9 70.0 74.5 51.6 21.0 13.8 16.8 6.0 7.7 7.8 2.2 2.8 1.8 0.6 0.0 20.0 -2.4 -1.4 -1.8
1992 2.4 2.7 4.1 73.9 77.6 58.7 18.5 14.4 20.5 5.9 8.2 8.7 1.7 2.4 1.3 0.1 0.0 13.2 -2.4 -5.5 -6.4
1993 2.1 3.4 4.0 77.0 78.2 59.9 16.5 14.8 19.8 5.1 6.6 7.4 1.6 1.9 1.0 0.0 0.0 14.3 -2.4 -5.0 -6.4
1994 4.7 3.1 3.5 76.3 78.1 55.4 13.4 14.7 17.4 5.0 5.6 5.9 1.6 2.1 1.0 1.0 0.0 21.6 -2.0 -3.6 -4.9
1995 2.0 3.5 2.7 77.6 79.9 60.1 15.5 12.4 16.7 5.2 4.9 6.2 1.6 2.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 16.4 -1.9 -2.8 -3.5
1996 1.9 3.0 2.6 79.4 79.7 62.1 13.8 13.0 17.9 4.8 4.6 5.4 1.8 1.9 1.1 0.0 0.0 13.1 -1.7 -2.1 -2.3
1997 1.7 3.0 2.2 80.1 79.5 60.6 12.9 12.5 18.1 4.6 4.6 5.7 2.1 2.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 13.7 -1.5 -1.7 -1.8
1998 1.7 2.6 2.1 80.4 78.3 54.7 12.7 14.0 18.4 4.7 4.6 4.7 2.1 1.8 1.2 0.0 0.0 20.5 -1.6 -1.4 -1.7
1999 1.6 2.9 2.2 80.5 74.6 55.4 13.3 17.0 23.4 4.4 5.1 5.7 1.8 1.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 13.9 -1.5 -1.3 -1.3
2000 1.4 2.6 2.0 81.3 74.1 59.2 13.0 17.6 22.1 4.1 5.0 6.6 1.7 1.9 0.8 0.0 0.0 10.4 -1.5 -1.2 -1.1
2001 1.3 2.7 1.9 82.0 74.1 70.5 12.3 17.5 19.5 4.1 5.2 6.0 1.8 1.6 0.9 0.0 0.0 2.3 -1.5 -1.2 -1.0
2002 1.2 2.1 2.4 82.7 74.0 66.7 12.1 18.6 23.5 3.9 4.7 5.7 1.7 1.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 2.1 -1.5 -1.3 -0.9
Average 2.3 2.8 3.2 73.1 74.6 49.1 17.6 16.0 21.3 5.8 6.2 7.9 2.8 2.6 2.0 0.3 0.0 18.9 -2.0 -2.2 -2.4
 
All figures are reported as percent of total assets, and are value weighted averages. Fixed assets are buildings and investments in affiliated 
companies. Short-term assets are cash, cash equivalents and securities held for trading. Downpayment contracts are loans that are amortized 
(gradual repayment of the principal), e.g. mortgages. Overdraft facilities are trade credits and other fixed limit loans. Building loans are fixed 
limit loans. Other loans include all other loans, e.g. credit card debt and leasing. Losses are allowances for losses on all loan portfolios. 
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Although the pooled average for losses is practically the same fraction of total 
assets in all three types (roughly 2%), the time pattern differs considerably. The 
fraction decreases slowly from about 2.4% at the end of the banking crisis to 1,7% 
four years later in non-PCC banks. In contrast, the losses are typically two to three 
times higher in commercial banks and PCCs in the final crisis year and are also larger 
every year over the next four years. Thus, pure savings banks that survived the crisis 
were less adversely affected by losses after the crisis than the survivors among the 
two other types. 
For expositional reasons, table 5 does not report the statistical significance of 
all the 462 pairs of differences across the three bank types. Choosing a 5% level and 
using a one-sided test, we find that compared to commercial banks, non-PCC banks 
have significantly more down-payment contracts, less short-term assets, and less 
unsecured loans in every year. Except for unsecured loans, the differences are 
generally less significant when comparing commercial banks to PCC banks. Finally, 
the difference between non-PCC banks and PCC banks is relatively seldom 
statistically different across all years and asset components. 
Finally, if we compare the value-weighted averages in table 5 to their equally 
weighted equivalents in appendix table A.1, we find size effects in the asset structure. 
First, large PCC banks and commercial banks tend to have more short-term assets and 
less down-payment contracts than smaller banks of the same type. For instance, the 
average allocation to short-term assets and down-payment contracts in PCC banks in 
2002 is 12.5% and 80.6% under equally-weighting and 18.6% and 74.0% with value-
weighting, respectively. The corresponding figures for commercials are 15.6% and 
78.4% versus 23.5% and 66.7%. Second, unlike pure savings banks, larger 
commercial banks and PCC banks have a higher proportion of fixed assets than 
corresponding banks of the same type. One possible explanation is that as banks grow, 
they tend to diversify into businesses other than lending, such as real estate. 
4.2 Liabilities 
Just like the assets, the right-hand side of the balance sheet matters for behavior and 
performance because it can be used to manage risk and return. For instance, banks 
relying on short term money market funding will face higher risks and higher 
expected returns than banks with a high fraction of core deposits. Also, the liability 
structure is important for survival under adverse market conditions, such as in the 
1988-1992 crisis years in our sample. This concern for financial distress is 
compounded by the fact that banks have much higher financial leverage than firms in 
other industries. Thus, differences in liability structure across bank types may reflect 
the uniqueness of their organizational form. 
We classify liabilities into the five categories of equity, due to customers, 
subordinated debt, due to financial institutions, and other liabilities.19 Risk is higher 
the more the bank is financed with debt, and the more risky the components of the 
debt. Deposits from customers is regarded the safest form of debt financing. This 
liability is insured by a fund collectively financed by the banks, and the government 
acts as a lender of last resort. Therefore, there is no deposit risk for the customers 
                                                 
19 The item Due to financial institutions is deposits and loans from other financial institutions, 
including the central bank. Due to customers is deposits from customers, subordinated debt is debt that 
can be included as capital when calculating capital adequacy ratios, and other liabilities is all other debt 
including debt securities issued. Equity is total funds for savings banks (including PCC capital for PCC 
banks) and total shareholder equity for commercial banks. Equity in savings banks includes the gift 
fund. 
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even if the bank faces financial distress. Interbank lending and other liabilities 
represent market funding. These liabilities are sensitive to interest rate movements 
and may also be more costly to roll over under adverse conditions. Thus, banks 
relying more on market funding are generally more risky than others. In the table, this 
means that risk generally increases from left to right. Moreover, we expect non-PCCs 
to use more equity and deposits from customers, whereas commercial banks would 
use interbank funding and other market-based debt financing. 
Consistent with the idea that non-PCC banks take less risk than other banks, 
table 6 shows that they have more equity than others. Moreover, equity for all bank 
types starts increasing after the end of the crisis, when the equity was around 7% for 
non-PCCs and 3% for the other two. Thus, all bank types become permanently less 
leveraged after the crisis, but non-PCC banks increase their relative equity financing 
the most.20 
The composition of the debt financing differs substantially across the three 
organizational types. Considering first the averages across the sample period, the table 
shows that compared to commercial banks, pure savings banks rely more on deposits 
(75% vs. 47%), use less subordinated debt (0.3% vs. 3.2%), borrow less from 
financial institutions (9.5 % vs. 18.9%), and finance less from other debt sources 
(6.6% vs. 25.8%). Thus, non-PCC banks finance their assets much more by deposits 
and much less by market borrowing than commercial banks. PCC banks are roughly 
midway between the two.  
For every bank type, the funding through financial institutions drops 
considerably over time, the importance of other liabilities increases, and the use of 
subordinated debt stays fairly constant.21 Savings banks rely increasingly less on 
deposits, whereas their importance for commercial banks stays fairly constant. 
However, the fraction of assets financed by deposits gradually approach each other in 
PCC banks and commercial banks. In the final year, they are 53.4% and 49.7%, 
respectively. This pattern suggests that just like commercial banks, which they 
resemble more and more over time in terms of debt structure, PCC banks are more 
dependent on the capital market than non-PCC banks. This financing strategy makes 
PCC banks more sensitive to adverse credit market conditions than the non-PCC type 
they have converted from. 
                                                 
20 Norwegian banking regulation imposes a minimum capital requirement. Total liable capital must be 
at least 8% of total risk weighted assets. Depending on the bank’s balance sheet structure, total risk-
weighted assets may differ substantially from total assets. 
21 Subordinated debt seems to have been important for PCC banks and commercial banks in the last 
part of the crisis and some years thereafter. This is probably due to the deposit insurance scheme, 
which contains two guarantee funds (one for savings banks and one for commercial banks) financed by 
the banks themselves. In addition, the central bank acts as a lender of last resort. There is no explicit 
public insurance system for financially distressed banks, and any support is determined on a case-by-
case basis. When banks were unable to meet their obligations during the crisis years, the guarantee 
funds disbursed subordinated debt to save struggling banks. As the crisis evolved, the guarantee funds’ 
capital was exhausted, and the government established a new guarantee fund and an investment fund 
that issued guarantees, extended loans, and also made equity investments in the troubled banks. 
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Table 6: Liability structure for the three bank types 
 Equity Subordinated debt Due to customers Due to banks Other liabilities 
Year 
Non-
PCC PCC Com 
Non-
PCC PCC Com 
Non-
PCC PCC Com 
Non-
PCC PCC Com 
Non-
PCC PCC Com 
1985 4.7  4.7 0.3  2.5 78.8  59.7 11.5  21.2 4.8  11.9 
1986 4.0  4.3 0.3  2.5 67.8  43.4 22.5  31.6 5.4  18.2 
1987 4.1  3.6 0.2  2.9 63.6  42.8 25.2  29.8 6.8  20.9 
1988 4.0 3.5 3.3 0.5 2.0 3.6 68.0 58.3 42.2 22.8 27.0 28.0 4.7 9.4 22.9 
1989 5.1 3.8 3.4 0.6 1.6 3.4 73.3 62.6 42.0 17.1 22.5 25.6 3.9 9.5 25.6 
1990 5.1 3.3 2.8 1.1 1.6 3.0 75.7 67.6 41.1 13.8 17.2 26.2 4.4 10.3 27.0 
1991 5.7 2.7 1.3 0.5 2.5 4.1 81.6 72.7 42.2 9.2 16.4 20.1 3.0 5.7 32.4 
1992 8.6 3.0 2.2 0.7 4.2 5.0 82.6 74.3 48.5 6.1 13.9 18.9 2.1 4.6 25.5 
1993 9.7 5.6 4.6 0.7 4.0 5.0 83.4 72.6 48.9 3.8 10.4 16.4 2.3 7.4 25.1 
1994 11.0 5.8 6.4 0.3 4.5 3.7 82.1 72.1 51.3 3.7 7.8 12.7 2.8 9.8 25.9 
1995 11.9 6.3 7.2 0.2 3.4 3.3 81.0 71.3 53.0 3.5 7.0 10.9 3.5 12.0 25.6 
1996 11.8 6.3 6.4 0.1 3.3 3.0 79.0 66.4 48.2 3.9 8.9 14.4 5.2 15.1 28.0 
1997 11.7 6.1 6.2 0.1 3.3 3.2 75.2 58.9 43.5 4.8 12.6 19.3 8.2 19.1 27.8 
1998 11.8 6.9 6.4 0.1 2.9 3.2 74.5 56.3 43.1 4.9 13.3 15.6 8.8 20.6 31.7 
1999 11.8 6.5 6.9 0.0 2.7 2.7 72.1 54.2 48.7 5.4 14.7 13.9 10.7 21.8 27.8 
2000 11.5 6.7 6.8 0.1 2.8 2.9 70.6 52.7 47.4 4.8 11.4 14.1 13.0 26.4 28.8 
2001 11.1 6.5 7.0 0.1 2.7 2.2 70.4 51.4 50.8 4.9 11.3 10.4 13.5 28.1 29.7 
2002 10.6 6.0 6.7 0.2 2.8 2.0 70.1 53.4 49.7 4.0 10.2 11.9 15.1 27.6 29.8 
Average 8.6 5.3 5.0 0.3 3.0 3.2 75.0 63.0 47.0 9.5 13.6 18.9 6.6 15.2 25.8 
All figures are reported as percent of total assets, and are value weighted averages. The total average weights the years equally. Subordinated debt is debt 
that can be regarded as capital for capital requirement calculations. Due to customers is regular deposits from customers. Due to banks is inter-bank loans 
including loans from the central bank. Other liabilities includes securities issued. 
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Like for assets in table 5, we do not report the statistical significance of all the 
differences across the three bank types. With a 5% level and a one-sided test, we find 
that across all years and all financing components, the difference in means between 
non-PCC banks and commercial banks (PCC) banks is significantly different from 
zero in 83% (89%) of the cases. PCC banks differ significantly from commercial 
banks in one third of the cases. 
Just like we found for asset structure, the composition of liabilities varies with 
bank size. If we compare the value-weighted averages in table 6 with their equally-
weighted counterparts in appendix table A.2, we find that independently of bank type, 
large banks rely more on loans from financial institutions and on other liabilities, 
while small savings banks finance themselves more often with deposits. This pattern 
might reflect that deposits is the preferred liability, but that large banks and 
particularly savings banks tend to deplete this resource and need to raise capital from 
the money market, the central bank, or elsewhere. An alternative explanation is that 
small banks have difficulties raising capital in the capital market due to high fixed 
issue costs and higher information asymmetry. 
 To check for differences in balance sheet structures more systematically and 
also to account for multivariate relationships, we estimate a logit model in table 7 that 
predicts bank type based on the bank’s size, growth, and balance sheet structure. We 
report our findings separately for the whole sample period (1985-2002), the crisis 
years (1988-1992), and for the post-crisis period (1993-2002). The results generally 
support the simple patterns in the descriptive statistics. For instance, the probability 
that a randomly selected bank is a commercial bank rather than a non-PCC bank is 
always significantly higher the larger the bank and the more risky its assets. In 
contrast, growth differences have no predictive power except for PCCs vs non-PCC 
banks after the crisis. 
 The basic idea in this section is that differences in stakeholder structure 
produce differences in behavior. In particular, the stronger the potential conflict of 
interest between powerful owners and other stakeholders (employees and customers), 
the riskier, larger, and more fast-growing the bank. However, stakeholder differences 
across banks may not be the only reason why their balance sheets differ. Because 
commercial banks are much larger than savings banks, they may be tempted to take 
on excessive risk, driven by a feeling of being too big to fail. This is a moral hazard 
problem triggered by the regulator’s desire to prevent contagion. Furthermore, the risk 
of non-PCCs may be low because they cannot raise new equity. Thus, unlike other 
bank types, pure savings banks may feel forced to maintain a higher equity financing 
buffer and hence lower liability risk to protect themselves from adverse effects of 
market downturns. These additional explanations, which have not been accounted for 
in this section, may bias our results towards finding larger risk differences between 
bank types than what is justified by their stakeholder structures alone. Although we 
are unable to address the potential moral hazard problem, section 5.4 will show that 
the inability to raise new equity in non-PCCs is not a binding constraint on their 
behavior. 
 Summarizing, this section has documented a systematic relationship between 
stakeholder structure and balance sheet composition across the three organizational 
forms. Non-PCC banks carry less risk on both sides of their balance sheet than 
commercial banks. This is consistent with stakeholder-driven firm behavior as found 
for depositor-owned S&Ls vs. stockholder-owned commercial banks in the US (Esty, 
1997a). Local governments and depositors, who hold a controlling stake in non-PCC 
banks, make sure the bank is run safely and provides loans to the local industry. In 
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contrast, stockholders control commercial banks and want it to maximize shareholder 
value by choosing assets and liabilities with higher risk. Finally, because the control 
rights in PCC banks belong to stakeholder types found both in pure savings banks 
(employees, customers, and politically appointed directors) and in pure commercial 
banks (employees and shareholders), our finding that PCC banks end up in between 
the two pure types on most balance sheet characteristics is as expected from the 
theory.  
We expect that these differences in risk across organizational forms will 
reappear in terms of systematic performance differences across changing market 
conditions. In particular, the lower risk of ownerless firms will make their returns to 
capital invested move less with overall market movements than owned firms. Thus, 
we expect that compared to commercial banks, the performance of pure savings banks 
is stronger the weaker the overall banking market. The next section supports this 
intuition. 
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Table 7: Logistic regressions for bank type 
 1986-2002 1988-1992 1993-2002 
Independent variable 
Comm (Non-
PCC) 
PCC (Non-
PCC) 
Com  
(PCC) 
Com (Non-
PCC) 
PCC (Non-
PCC) 
Com  
(PCC) 
Com (Non-
PCC) 
PCC (Non-
PCC) 
Com 
(PCC) 
Constant -2.36 -33.42 83.22 7.64 -32.40 58.28 -335.13 -30.12 117.56 
 -0.46 -7.36 5.86 0.96 -3.02 3.50 na -5.97 4.14 
Size 0.87 0.93 0.09 0.51 0.90 -0.24 27.57 0.88 0.51 
 5.65 9.55 0.43 1.90 3.83 -0.83 0.06 8.17 1.27 
Growth -2.99 4.62 -3.38 -1.73 0.00 -2.05 99.00 6.10 -2.83 
 -1.90 3.87 -1.83 -0.98 0.00 -1.14 na 4.45 -0.45 
Liability risk 22.37 8.61 33.58 23.83 12.76 23.85 478.89 8.03 47.17 
 8.07 5.78 6.21 5.02 3.15 3.56 na 5.00 4.28 
Asset risk -1.27 -20.67 70.45 -3.34 12.76 44.02 -23.17 -15.60 100.21 
  -0.41 -5.89 6.17 -0.81 3.15 3.44 na -3.70 4.34 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Random effects no no no no no no no no no 
Log likelihood -107.6 -369.7 -54.2 -46.6 -60.9 -26.3 0.0 -304.0 -23.2 
LR chi2 864.0 608.2 324.0 302.1 147.9 67.8 486.5 430.6 227.8 
Probability chi2, % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R2 80.1 45.1 74.9 76.4 54.8 56.3 100.0 41.5 83.1 
n 2237 1979 331 701 678 91 1185 1301 240 
The dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 (0) if the bank is of the type specified outside (inside) the parenthesis in the column heading. Size is the log 
of total assets, growth is the gross growth in total assets from beginning to end of year t. Asset risk is the fraction of assets which is not cash, claims on 
the central bank, loans to customers, or fixes assets. Liability risk is operationalized as one minus deposits divided by total assets. We report the log 
likelihood ratio (LR), the Chi2 of LR, its probability, the pseudo R2, and the number of observations. 
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5. Stakeholders and performance 
So far, we have found that the stakeholder structure relates systematically to the 
firm’s behavior. However, the critical governance question from an economic point of 
view is not whether stakeholder structures matter for behavior per se, but whether this 
relationship influences performance. As discussed in section 2, the principal-agent 
paradigm argues that the firm’s economic performance will be lower the weaker the 
control rights of the owners and the more sensitive the firm’s decisions to welfare 
effects on non-owner stakeholders. Thus, because owners have a controlling majority 
in profit-maximizing commercial banks but not in more stakeholder-oriented savings 
banks, commercial banks will have higher returns to capital invested. Moreover, 
although all savings banks have multiple goals and several stakeholder types with 
control rights, capital owners have partial control in PCC banks, but do not even exist 
in non-PCCs. Thus, the agency model predicts that PCC banks will outperform non-
PCCs in economic terms. According to Allen et al. (2006), however, owners of capital 
may fare better and not worse if they internalize other stakeholders’ welfare in the 
firm’s objective function. 
Because non-PCC banks are unlisted, we cannot measure performance by 
market returns. Instead, our basic performance measure is book return on assets 
(ROA), which we define as net income per unit book value of total assets. Although 
return on equity (net income per unit book equity) is a more direct measure of 
economic performance from the stockholders’ point of view, it is unsuitable in our 
context because its denominator is periodically very low and even negative in the 
crisis years, producing very volatile figures. For instance, average return on equity 
across the commercial banks is –152% in 1991 and 18% in 1997.  
 The reason we measure return on assets after rather than before debt funding 
costs is that these costs is by far the largest component of the bank’s total costs, 
typically 70-80%. Thus, not deducting funding costs means ignoring a major driver of 
the bank’s competitive advantage. For the same reason, earnings before funding costs, 
which is completely dominated by interest income, is very sensitive to the level of 
interest rates. This means gross return on assets will move automatically in tandem 
with the level of interest rates, regardless of the bank’s ability to create returns on 
capital invested. Such interest level effects are absent in our ROA measure, which is 
also used in the existing research that comes closest to ours (Esty, 1997a; Crespi et al, 
2004). Notice that because our net ROA relates income after debt funding costs to 
total assets, it will produce lower return figures than under the gross ROA definition. 
Thus, we cannot meaningfully relate ROA to standard benchmarks such as the riskless 
rate or the market risk premium. Still, in order to assess the sensitivity of our findings 
to the performance measure used, we will analyze the effect of using alternative 
performance measures in section 5.3. Simple descriptive statistics of these alternatives 
are presented in section 5.1, 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
The first three columns of table 8 show the sample firms’ average ROA across bank 
types and time periods. On average over the years, pure savings banks have the 
highest return on assets, being 0.88% in non-PCC banks, 0.41% in PCCs, and 0.32% 
in commercial banks. Non-PCCs outperform commercial banks in 15 of the 18 sample 
years, and PCC banks are closer to commercial banks than to non-PCCs. However, 
the t-values to the right show that the statistical significance of the performance 
differences is considerably weaker after the banking crisis than before and during the 
crisis. 
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Table 8: The return on assets   
 Mean  
 (1) (2) (3) 
t-value for  
difference in mean  
Year Non-PCC PCC Com (1)-(2) (2)-(3)  (1)-(3)  
1985 0.43  0.35   1.57  
1986 0.46  0.35   1.79*  
1987 0.55  0.07   4.60*  
1988 0.40 -0.15 -0.97 3.20* 1.02 1.74*  
1989 0.64 -0.05 -0.51 2.86* 0.52 1.36  
1990 0.50 -1.00 -0.19 1.37* -0.71 2.31*  
1991 0.33 -1.14 -1.91 2.04* 0.71 2.61*  
1992 2.60 0.01 -0.59 2.85* 0.50 3.93*  
1993 1.41 1.55 0.98 -0.45 1.82* 3.65*  
1994 1.15 0.99 0.96 1.32 0.14 0.88  
1995 1.27 0.80 1.16 1.58 -0.98 0.43  
1996 0.67 0.56 0.92 1.05 -1.34 -0.99  
1997 1.06 0.84 1.03 1.58 -0.98 0.19  
1998 0.83 0.80 0.74 0.40 0.49 0.89  
1999 1.11 1.05 0.92 0.72 0.95 1.59  
2000 1.18 1.00 0.91 1.92* 0.66 2.20*  
2001 0.76 0.66 0.86 1.07 -1.19 -0.67  
2002 0.52 0.22 0.63 1.56 -2.18* -1.66  
Average 0.88 0.41 0.32 2.02* 0.33 2.38*  
The table reports the equally weighted return on assets (ROA) for the 
population of Norwegian banks. ROA is defined as net income divided 
by total assets. t-values marked with a * reflects a difference between 
two means which is statistically different from zero at the 5% level. 
Non-PCC banks are ownerless foundations (pure savings banks). PCC 
banks used to be pure savings banks that later transformed themselves 
into PCC banks by issuing equity securities to the general public in 
terms of  Primary Capital Certificates (PCC).  
 
Appendix tables A.3-A.6 show the differences in average performance based 
on four alternatives to the ROA in table 8. Focusing on the statistically significant 
differences, table A.3 shows that the interest rate margin (net interest income divided 
by assets) is always lowest in commercial banks, and that non-PCC banks mostly 
have higher interest rate margins than PCC banks. The profit margin (net income 
divided by income) in table A.4 seldom differs across bank types after the crisis. 
Finally, the gross return on assets (income before funding costs divided by assets) in 
table A.5 and the return on equity (net income divided by equity) in table A.6 
generally show insignificant differences between bank types up to and including the 
banking crisis, and that performance in highest in commercial banks after the crisis. 
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Table 9 shows the volatility of ROA per bank across the three bank types, 
measuring volatility in year t as the standard deviation of ROA over the period t-1 to 
t+1. Like we found using risk measures from the balance sheet in section 4, risk is 
highest in commercial banks (0.68%), lowest in non-PCCs (0.45%), and PCCs are in 
between (0.58%). As expected, volatility is higher for all bank types around the 
banking crisis. 
 
Table 9: The volatility of return on assets 
Non-PCC bank PCC bank Commercial bank 
Year Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1985       
1986 0.14 0.12   0.24 0.23 
1987 0.18 0.14   0.89 0.33 
1988 0.21 0.18 0.23 0.12 0.88 0.27 
1989 0.22 0.20 1.06 0.24 0.46 0.25 
1990 0.34 0.18 0.83 0.47 1.46 1.09 
1991 1.29 1.46 1.17 0.81 1.76 1.62 
1992 1.24 1.34 1.54 0.79 1.94 1.94 
1993 1.02 1.02 0.72 0.54 1.36 1.58 
1994 0.30 0.23 0.45 0.38 0.38 0.30 
1995 0.40 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.31 0.29 
1996 0.35 0.33 0.38 0.32 0.34 0.23 
1997 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.20 0.35 0.41 
1998 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.12 0.09 
1999 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.15 0.10 
2000 0.30 0.27 0.29 0.23 0.11 0.13 
2001 0.38 0.32 0.46 0.30 0.17 0.17 
Average 0.45 0.43 0.58 0.37 0.68 0.56 
The table reports the equally weighted average and the median volatility of 
the return on assets (ROA) for a non-PCC bank, a PCC bank and a 
commercial bank. ROA is defined as net income divided by total assets. 
The average in the bottom row is based on the pooled sample The volatility 
of ROA at time t is calculated as the standard deviation of the bank’s ROA 
in the window from t-1 to t+1. The volatility for the first year t after a 
conversion from non-PCC to PCC uses the ROA at t-1, which is the last 
year that the bank was still a non-PCC. Correspondingly, the volatility of a 
non-PCC bank in the last year before conversion uses the ROA for the first 
year after conversion. Non-PCC banks are ownerless foundations (pure 
savings banks). PCC banks used to be pure savings banks that later 
transformed themselves into PCC banks by issuing equity securities to the 
general public in terms of Primary Capital Certificates (PCC). 
 
 
 
Table 8 shows that the performance of commercial banks was most negatively 
hit by the banking crisis. As discussed in section 4, this is implied by our finding that 
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they pursue more risky investment and financing strategies. That is, the fact that 
commercial banks have more risky balance sheets will necessarily make them more 
vulnerable to downturns in the market. What is more surprising is that they do not 
appear to be doing correspondingly better after the crisis. We next analyze this issue. 
5.2 Statistical tests for the base case 
Since our data set has a panel data structure, using OLS on the pooled sample will 
produce biased and inefficient estimates. To reduce this problem, we use a random 
effects panel data model to account for fixed effects at the firm level and year 
dummies to capture fixed effects for the banking industry as a whole. Although this 
section only discusses the results using random effects and time dummies, the tables 
also show the findings using time dummies only (and no random effects) and using 
neither of the two (i.e., pooled OLS with no fixed effect controls). We return to these 
two alternative models in section 5.3. 
Our findings for the base case are reported in table 10. PCC and Com are 
dummy variables that equal one if the bank is of the said type and zero otherwise. 
Thus, both are zero for a non-PCC bank. We proxy for asset risk and liability risk by 
the ratio 1-((cash+loans+fixed assets)/total assets) and the ratio 1-(due to 
customers/total assets), respectively, leaving the alternative risk measure based on 
ROA to the robustness tests in section 5.3. The role of firm size in captured by the log 
of total assets. 
According to the agency model, the two dummy variables will have positive 
coefficient estimates, and the coefficient for the commercial bank will be the more 
positive of the two. In the Allen et al. (2005) model, however, we cannot in general 
rank the coefficients a priori. The specific situation (such as the customers’ 
willingness to pay higher prices for products from stakeholder-oriented firms) will 
determine whether savings banks will have higher or lower abnormal returns to 
capital invested than commercial banks. Although we deal with accounting returns on 
operations rather than market returns on traded securities, we still expect that unless 
the banking industry is grossly out of equilibrium over extended periods, there will be 
a positive relationship between risk and return. Moreover, economies (diseconomies) 
of scale in banking will produce a positive (negative) coefficient for the size variable. 
Since the evidence on scale economies in banking is ambiguous (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1994; Hughes et al, 2001), we do not predict the sign for the size 
coefficient. Also, since what matters for this argument is size per se rather than how 
this has been attained, we do not distinguish between size attained by organic growth 
and by takeovers. 
Model (a) includes random effects and year dummies in all three panels. 
According to the left panel, which shows the results for the whole period, this model 
explains 31% of the variation in a bank’s ROA, and the chi2 is highly significant. 
Non-PCC savings banks, which we know from table 8 have an average ROA of 0.9%, 
outperform PCC savings banks by 0.18 ROA percentage units per year and 
commercial banks by 0.77 after having controlled for risk and size differences. The 
riskiness of the assets and the liabilities are both positively related to returns, and 
there are diseconomies of scale.22 All these findings are statistically significant.
                                                 
22 The finding that small banks outperform large banks may at least partially be explained by the fact 
that during the crisis period, several small, poorly performing banks were taken over by larger banks or 
merged with low-performing small banks. Moreover, the government’s rescuing policy for failing 
banks was to make them merge with a larger non-failing bank or let two failing banks  merge before 
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Table 10: The relationship between performance, bank type, risk, and size: Base-case regressions 
 1985-2002 1988-1992 1993-2002 
Independent variable (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) 
Constant   1.835   6.437   2.020 
   4.80   5.93   6.60 
PCC -0.181 -0.319 -0.316 -1.510 -1.168 -1.098 -0.095 -0.206 -0.157 
 -2.27 -4.75 -4.00 -4.63 -4.55 -3.65 -1.70 -4.99 -3.36 
Com -0.765 -0.745 -0.922 -2.741 -2.156 -2.092 -0.119 -0.320 -0.074 
 -5.61 -7.71 -8.52 -6.84 -7.72 -6.39 -0.96 -3.94 -0.84 
Asset risk 1.419 2.001 0.256 1.352 2.074 1.211 1.321 1.923 2.461 
 5.27 8.78 1.12 1.74 3.16 1.81 5.89 10.40 12.22 
Liability risk 0.836 0.799 0.696 4.385 3.171 2.587 -0.482 -0.132 -0.591 
 3.65 4.22 3.27 6.33 6.18 4.36 -2.71 -0.89 -3.71 
Bank size -0.063 -0.057 -0.015 -0.219 -0.223 -0.187 0.053 0.064 0.053 
  -2.78 -3.97 -0.93 -3.18 -5.28 -3.80 2.95 5.72 4.17 
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes no yes yes No 
Random effects yes no no yes no no yes no No 
Adj. R2, % 31.11 30.88 3.76 37.20 37.10 13.92 33.08 33.43 12.97 
F-value (Wald chi2) 1110.7 55.0 21.8 450.4 49.3 23.7 736.3 49.8 41.6 
Probability of F (chi2), % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
n 2660 2660 2660 738 738 738 1362 1362 1362 
The table relates a bank's economic performance to its hypothesized determinants as specified in the leftmost column. The models (a), (b), 
and (c) represent three alternative ways of handling the panel data structure as specified in the two first rows in the bottom section of the 
table. Performance is measured as return on assets (ROA), which we operationalize as net income after taxes divided by total assets at year 
end. PCC (Com) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a PCC bank (Commercial bank) and zero otherwise. Asset risk is the 
fraction of assets which is not cash, claims on the central bank, loans to customers, or fixed assets. Liability risk is operationalized as one 
minus deposits divided by total assets. We assume that the lower the value of these two measures, the smaller the risk. Bank size is the log of 
the bank's assets in constant 2002 NOK. 
In the Year dummies row, a yes (no) reflects that we include (do not include) a time dummy to capture time fixed effects. Similarly a yes 
(no) in the Random effects row means that we use (do not use) random effects estimation to capture firm fixed effects. We report the 
estimated regression coefficients in bold and its t-statistic in italics. The bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R2, F-value (Wald 
chi2 for random effects regressions) with corresponding p-value, and the number of observations for each regression. 
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The middle panel of table 10 estimates the basic model over the crisis years 
1988-1992. Every estimated sign from the full sample period is maintained, and the 
economic as well as the statistical significance of the estimates increase considerably 
except for asset risk. For instance, the expected excess ROA of a pure savings bank is 
now 1.5 percentage units relative to a PCC and 2.7 compared to a commercial bank. 
Thus, what holds for the full sample period is even more pronounced in the crisis 
years. As noticed in section 4, the fact that ownerless banks are less risky makes us 
expect that they will do better that others in a systemic crisis. 
So, maybe the pattern for the full period in the left panel is driven by the 
exceptional crisis years in the middle panel. The right panel brings us closer to an 
answer. Although the coefficients of the two dummy variables keep their negative 
sign, they are much smaller, being down by almost 50% for PCCs and by over 80% 
for commercial banks. Moreover, the coefficient of the commercial bank dummy is 
not significantly different from zero, and the coefficient of the PCC dummy is only 
significant at the 9% level. Thus, as indicated by the univariate statistics in section 
5.1, there is no convincing performance difference between the three bank types after 
the crisis.23 It may be argued, however, that the full period is more relevant than any 
of the two subperiods when evaluating the performance of alternative organizational 
forms. An organization that exists both in normal and non-normal periods must have 
an ability to handle both. Anyway, we can at least conclude so far that the surprising 
result in an agency perspective is that owned firms do not outperform ownerless firms 
in normal times either. 
That being said, however, one may wonder what remains of the classic 
arguments for ownerless banks. Unlike in earlier periods, it does not seem true 
anymore that their customers (lenders and borrowers) would face excessive 
contracting costs in commercial banks, that they have particularly homogenous 
preferences as a group, that they would lack regulatory protection against moral 
hazard by commercial bank owners, or that ownerless banks are so small that agency 
costs are negligible. Nevertheless, our findings are inconsistent with the argument that 
because ownerless firms retain all their earnings and are immune to the market for 
corporate control, they represent the only firm type in our sample that can survive 
long after having lost their competitive advantage as an organizational form 
(Hansmann, 1996, p. 262). If this were a valid explanation, the ownerless savings 
banks in our sample would have had weaker performance than other banks. If 
anything, we find the opposite. 
5.3 Robustness 
We analyse the robustness of our base-case findings by (i) comparing the results 
under different ways of handling the panel structure, (ii) using sized-matched samples, 
(iii) proxying for risk by ROA volatility, and (iv) measuring performance in 
alternative ways.  
Table 10 documents that the econometric approach to the panel structure 
influences the estimates. If we neither account for fixed effects per firm nor per year 
and instead just run OLS on the pooled sample like in model (c), the adjusted R2 drops 
by almost 90% for the full period and by roughly two thirds in the two subperiods 
compared to models (a) and (b). Still, the estimated sign and the statistical 
significance of the coefficients in (c) are not strikingly different from those in models 
                                                 
23 Notice also that liability risk is now inversely related to performance, and there are economies rather 
than diseconomies of scale. 
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(a) and (b), suggesting that the pooled OLS is not grossly biased and inefficient. The 
second point to notice from models (a) and (b) is that what matters for overall model 
fit is the time dummies. Thus, the fixed effect ruining the OLS estimates stem from 
time-varying characteristics of the banking industry as a whole rather than firm-
specific effects ignored by our bank-specific measures of risk and size.  
The base-case results may be influenced by the fact the most non-PCCs are 
small compared to PCCs and commercial banks. For instance, table 4 shows that the 
median commercial bank is sixty times larger than the median pure savings bank. 
Although our base-case models do control for size, the fact that size is consistently 
different across bank types may create a sample heterogeneity that is not properly 
picked up by our control variable. For instance, the technology used by small banks 
may deviate so much from the technology of large banks that size alone does not 
capture this difference. To test for the seriousness of this heterogeneity, we construct a 
matching sample where size is much more homogeneous across bank types. Our 
matched sample only contains pure savings banks that are larger than the smallest 
commercial bank, and we keep at least as many non-PCC banks as commercial banks 
in the sample. These restrictions reduce sample size by roughly 80% compared to the 
base-case. Findings are reported in table 11. 
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Table 11: The relationship between performance, bank type, risk, and size: Size-matched samples 
 1985-2002 1988-1992 1993-2002 
Independent variable (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) 
Constant   -2.571   4.545   2.809 
   -1.90   1.38   2.18 
PCC -0.220 -0.289 -0.145 -0.961 -0.810 -0.782 -0.048 -0.065 -0.026 
 -1.18 -1.84 -0.84 -1.54 -1.63 -1.53 -0.51 -0.87 -0.32 
Com -0.652 -0.639 -0.570 -2.123 -1.811 -1.677 -0.071 -0.144 -0.054 
 -2.57 -3.75 -3.06 -2.44 -3.70 -3.36 -0.44 -1.28 -0.47 
Asset risk 1.578 2.135 -3.106 -0.256 2.036 0.190 0.985 0.808 3.080 
 1.25 1.76 -2.89 -0.09 0.71 0.07 0.79 0.72 2.65 
Liability risk 0.927 0.965 0.376 2.916 2.882 2.426 -0.589 -0.485 -0.651 
 1.80 2.66 0.97 1.82 3.16 2.65 -2.17 -2.21 -2.92 
Bank size -0.032 -0.031 0.045 -0.090 -0.148 -0.158 0.080 0.095 0.036 
  -0.38 -0.63 0.87 -0.31 -1.01 -1.04 1.97 3.43 1.33 
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no 
Random effects yes no no yes no no yes no no 
Adj. R2, % 28.27  25.09  3.97  16.79  12.30  7.32  30.27  25.94  8.37  
F-value (Wald chi2) 162.3 8.2 4.9 24.3 3.2 3.3 101.6 6.7 5.2 
Probability of F (chi2), % 0.00  0.00  0.02  0.39  0.13  0.80  0.00  0.00  0.02  
n 473 473 473 145 145 145 229 229 229 
This table reestimates the base-case model with size-matched samples, which only contain savings banks that are larger than the smallest commercial bank, 
while ensuring that the sample has at least as many non-PCC banks as commercial banks. The models (a), (b), and (c) represent three alternative ways of 
handling the panel data structure as specified in the two first rows in the bottom section of the table. Performance is measured as return on assets (ROA), which 
we operationalize as net income after taxes divided by total assets at year end. PCC (Com) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a PCC bank 
(Commercial bank) and zero otherwise. Asset risk is the fraction of assets which is not cash, claims on the central bank, loans to customers, or fixed assets. 
Liability risk is operationalized as one minus deposits divided by total assets. We assume that the lower these two measures, the smaller the risk. Bank size is the 
log of the bank's assets in constant 2002 NOK. In the Year dummies row, a yes (no) reflects that we include (do not include) a time dummy to capture time fixed 
effects. Similarly a yes (no) in the Random effects row means that we use (do not use) random effects estimation to capture firm fixed effects. We report the 
estimated regression coefficients in bold and its t-statistic in italics. The bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R2, F-value (Wald chi2 for random effects 
regressions) with corresponding p-value, and the number of observations for each regression. 
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Table 11 shows that when we re-estimate the base-case model in the matched 
sample, the main results persist. As expected, the coefficients for the PCC and the 
commercial bank dummies have weaker statistical significance due to much smaller 
samples. 
Table 12 re-estimates the base-case model measuring risk by ROA volatility 
rather than the proxies based on the structure of assets and liabilities. The relationship 
between bank type and ROA from table 10 is generally upheld, but the economic and 
statistical significance drops. Also, PCCs are closer to non-PCCs than earlier. For the 
risk proxy, the relationship between risk and return becomes negative and is stronger 
in the full period than in the two sub-periods. We suspect this strange relationship 
reflects two fundamental data problems in the volatility measure. First, a given value 
of this proxy is only based on three annual observations. This reflects the fact that we 
only have annual data and a limited time series. Second, the structural relationship 
between risk and return is unstable over the sample period. This is because volatility 
is very high and performance is very low during the crisis years. Thus, we prefer the 
risk measures based on the balance sheet to the one based on ROA volatility. 
  The fourth robustness test checks what happens if we replace the ROA 
performance measure used so far with either the gross ROA (which is ROA before 
funding costs), ROE (return on equity), the profit margin (net income over revenues), 
or the interest rate margin (net interest income over assets). Table 13 shows the 
findings, where we simplify the exposition by only reporting the estimates from 
models with both fixed firm effects and fixed time effects. The results are more 
consistent with those under ROA from table 10 when we measure performance by 
gross ROA, ROE or the profit margin than by the interest rate margin. For instance, 
ROA, gross ROA, ROE, and the profit margin all produce a negative and significant 
coefficient for the PCC and the Commercial dummies in the full period and the crisis 
period. They also have a positive, significant sign for asset risk in all cases except 
two. The only noticeable difference is that unlike ROA, ROE, and the profit margin, 
gross ROA indicates that commercial banks do significantly better than the two other 
bank types after the crisis.  
For reasons discussed in the beginning of section 5, we consider ROA the 
more suitable performance measure in our case. Still, it is reassuring that the major 
conclusions about the relative performance is quite insensitive to how performance is 
measured. 
So far, we have ignored the potential endogeneity problem caused by the fact 
that poorly performing non-PCC banks may have converted to PCCs to be able to 
raise new equity. Ignoring this possibility may bias our results towards overestimating 
the relative performance of non-PCCs. We explore this possibility by testing the base-
case model under two alternative samples.  First, we pool all savings banks (i.e., non-
PCCs and PCCs) into one joint group. Second, we exclude all PCCs from the sample 
and also non-PCCs that later convert to PCC status. The results are reported in tables 
14 and 15, respectively. Overall, we observe no material changes to the base-case 
results in table 10 in terms of differences between commercial banks and non-PCC 
banks. 
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Table 12: The relationship between performance, bank type, risk, and size: Measuring risk by ROA volatility 
 1985-2002 1988-1992 1993-2002 
Independent variable  (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) 
Constant   1.198   0.027   0.566 
   5.78   5.11   3.53 
PCC -0.027 -0.215 -0.198 -0.921 -0.806 -0.009 -0.033 -0.189 -0.193 
 -0.38 -3.52 -2.61 -3.44 -3.95 -3.30 -0.63 -4.72 -4.26 
Com -0.466 -0.460 -0.730 -1.156 -0.902 -0.012 -0.154 -0.293 -0.207 
 -3.90 -5.67 -7.37 -4.12 -4.69 -4.84 -1.29 -4.12 -2.60 
ROA volatility -28.422 -27.161 2.649 -26.734 -28.427 0.079 -5.046 3.408 22.765 
 -9.03 -8.77 0.87 -4.65 -5.22 1.38 -1.41 0.85 6.47 
Bank size -0.073 -0.057 -0.021 -0.125 -0.155 -0.001 0.016 0.045 0.030 
  -3.60 -4.37 -1.31 -2.54 -4.76 -3.52 0.89 4.22 2.53 
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no 
Random effects yes no no yes no no yes no no 
Adj. R2, % 38.95 38.74 4.46 46.26 45.80 12.77 25.17 25.68 4.52 
F-value (Wald chi2) 1451.6 75.4 27.1 738.6 77.5 27.5 2778.0 36.1 15.4 
Probability of F (chi2), % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
n 2236 2236 2236 725 725 725 1220 1220 1220 
This table reestimates the base-case model, using the volatility of assets returns as a proxy for bank risk. The models (a), (b), and (c) represent three 
alternative ways of handling the panel data structure as specified in the two first rows in the bottom section of the table. Performance is measured as return 
on assets (ROA), which we operationalize as net income after taxes divided by total assets at year end. PCC (Com) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
bank is a PCC bank (Commercial bank) and zero otherwise. The volatility of ROA at time t is calculated as the standard deviation of the bank’s ROA in 
the window from t-1 to t+1. The volatility for the first year t after a conversion from non-PCC to PCC uses the ROA at t-1, which is the last year that the 
bank was still a non-PCC. Correspondingly, the volatility of a non-PCC bank in the last year before conversion uses the ROA for the first year after 
conversion. Bank size is the log of the bank's assets in 2002 NOK. 
In the Year dummies row, a yes (no) reflects that we include (do not include) a time dummy to capture time fixed effects. Similarly a yes (no) in the 
Random effects row means that we use (do not use) random effects estimation to capture firm fixed effects. We report the estimated regression coefficients 
in bold and its t-statistic in italics. The bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R2, F-value (Wald chi-squared for random effects regressions) with 
corresponding p-value, and the number of observations for each regression. The Wald chi2 statistic is reported for the random effects regressions. 
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Table 13: The relationship between performance and bank type: Alternative performance measures 
 1985 – 2002 1988 - 1992 1993 - 2002 
Independent variable 
Gross 
return on 
assets 
Return 
on 
equity 
Profit 
margin 
Interest 
rate 
margin
Gross 
return on 
assets 
Return 
on 
equity 
Profit 
margin 
Interest 
rate 
margin
Gross 
return on 
assets 
Return 
on equity
Profit 
margin
Interest 
rate 
margin 
PCC -0.38 -11.52 -2.64 0.25 -1.48 -1.51 -11.22 0.15 -0.26 -0.97 -1.55 0.12 
 -4.70 -3.14 -3.96 6.13 -4.88 -4.63 -4.83 1.49 -4.02 -1.57 -1.95 2.46 
Com -0.45 -28.53 -5.92 -0.27 -2.48 -2.74 -18.47 -0.70 0.49 1.71 -1.07 -0.84 
 -3.09 -5.39 -5.43 -2.04 -6.76 -6.84 -6.77 -4.25 3.44 1.29 -0.60 -5.33 
Asset risk 1.08 -1.22 15.44 -0.55 0.26 -0.22 13.25 -0.81 1.22 1.79 18.38 0.00 
  3.92 -1.56 6.82 -4.09 0.37 -3.18 2.43 -3.24 4.79 9.50 5.87 0.01 
Liability risk 1.45 29.16 4.36 -2.21 5.30 4.39 29.66 -2.63 1.07 -7.13 -10.96 -1.80 
  6.14 2.83 2.29 -17.29 8.29 6.33 6.14 -11.20 5.26 -3.55 -4.33 -12.35 
Bank size 0.05 15.11 -0.19 -0.19 -0.08 1.35 -1.70 -0.11 0.08 -3.01 1.10 -0.09 
  1.86 1.22 -1.08 -8.28 -1.34 1.74 -3.72 -3.73 3.76 -1.19 4.26 -3.86 
Adj. R2, % 77.27 3.45 40.23 68.02 30.21 37.2 42.02 63.79 69.79 35.08 24.43 69.23 
Wald chi2 9933 94 1749 23172 359 450 548 616 3916 630 460 19362 
Prob. of chi2, % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
n 2660 2652 2660 2660 738 738 738 738 1362 1362 1362 1362 
Using random firm effects and fixed time effects, this table re-estimates the base-case model under four alternative performance measures, which are 
specified at the top of each column. Gross return on assets is income before funding costs divided by assets, return on equity is net income divided by book 
equity, profit margin is net income over revenues, and interest rate margin is net interest income over assets. PCC (Com) is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the bank is a PCC bank (Commercial bank) and zero otherwise. Asset risk is the fraction of assets which is not cash, claims on the central bank, loans to 
customers, or fixed assets. Liability risk is operationalized as one minus deposits divided by total assets. We assume that the larger these two measures, the 
higher the risk. Size is the log of the bank's assets in constant 2002 NOK. We report the estimated regression coefficients in bold and its t-statistic in italics. 
The bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R2, the Wald chi2, its p-value, and the number of observations. 
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Table 14 : The relationship between performance and bank type: All savings banks vs commercial banks 
 1985-2002 1988-1992 1993-2002 
Indep. var. I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
Constant 2.02 0.07   7.42 5.48   2.13 1.92   
 5.31 0.14   7.00 3.65   6.99 4.85   
Commercial -0.78 -0.90 -0.59 -0.70 -1.72 -2.32 -1.76 -2.35 0.05 0.33 -0.15 -0.04 
 -7.59 -5.35 -6.47 -5.20 -5.49 -4.96 -6.54 -5.94 0.57 2.70 -2.00 -0.34 
Liability risk 0.54 0.19 0.63 0.76 2.39 2.93 2.94 4.35 -0.73 -1.12 -0.34 -0.57 
 2.56 0.72 3.36 3.33 4.01 3.66 5.68 6.22 -4.72 -6.25 -2.39 -3.29 
Asset risk 0.34 -0.38 2.11 1.43 1.64 -0.10 2.53 1.79 2.51 2.16 2.02 1.31 
 1.51 -1.44 9.28 5.30 2.47 -0.11 4.41 2.30 12.54 9.00 10.90 5.79 
Bank size -0.04 0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.25 -0.18 -0.29 -0.31 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 
  -2.21 1.30 -5.57 -3.17 -5.44 -2.36 -7.27 -4.66 3.22 0.48 4.23 2.49 
Year dummies no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes 
Random effects no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Adjusted R2, % 3.22 2.19 30.32 30.57 11.88 10.91 35.40 35.27 12.31 11.07 32.25 32.08 
F 23.1 35.9 56.1 1710.8 25.9 43.4 51.5 416.9 48.8 156.1 50.8 2762.1 
Probability F, % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 2660 2660 2660 2660 738 738 738 738 1362 1362 1362 1362 
The table relates a bank's economic performance to its hypothesized determinants as specified in the leftmost column. Performance is measured as return on assets 
(ROA), which we operationalize as net income after taxes divided by total assets at year end. Commercial is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a 
commercial bank and zero otherwise. Asset risk is the fraction of assets which is not cash, claims on the central bank, loans to customers, or fixed assets. Liability 
risk is operationalized as one minus deposits divided by total assets. We assume that the lower these two measures, the smaller the risk. Bank size is the log of the 
bank's assets in constant 2002 NOK. In the Year dummies row, a yes (no) reflects that we include (do not include) a time dummy to capture time fixed effects. A 
yes (no) in the Random effects row means that we use (do not use) random effects estimation to capture firm fixed effects. We report the estimated regression 
coefficients in bold and its t-statistic in italics. The bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R2, F-value (Wald chi2 for random effects regressions) with 
corresponding p-value, and the number of observations. 
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Table 15: The relationship between performance and bank type: Non-PCC banks vs commercial banks 
 1985-2002 1988-1992 1993-2002 
Indep. var. I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
Constant 2.02 0.38   6.50 4.36   2.63 2.80   
 5.17 0.70   5.97 2.72   8.52 6.90   
Commercial -0.85 -0.85 -0.62 -0.65 -2.03 -2.59 -2.02 -2.54 0.14 0.49 -0.13 0.02 
 -7.64 -4.90 -6.33 -4.49 -6.21 -5.22 -7.39 -5.97 1.55 3.72 -1.47 0.17 
Liability risk 0.66 0.21 0.66 0.72 2.49 2.92 2.93 4.33 -0.59 -0.95 -0.18 -0.38 
 2.97 0.75 3.42 2.98 4.19 3.55 5.81 6.03 -3.52 -4.84 -1.14 -1.99 
Asset risk 0.25 -0.39 1.88 1.17 2.90 -0.44 2.11 1.36 2.31 2.04 1.84 1.24 
 1.11 -1.49 8.49 4.40 4.19 -0.48 3.82 1.74 11.99 8.86 10.45 5.76 
Bank size -0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.09 -1.93 -0.11 -0.23 -0.27 0.00 -0.05 0.02 0.00 
  -1.82 0.50 -5.24 -3.69 -3.84 -1.33 -5.48 -3.52 -0.18 -2.50 1.60 0.09 
Year dummies no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes 
Random effects no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Adjusted R2, % 3.81 3.29 34.11 33.72 12.04 11.23 38.40 38.28 12.82 11.33 33.63 33.49 
F 25.2 32.7 59.8 1702.6 25.1 41.7 55.8 525.6 43.3 150.9 47.0 2973.2 
Probability F, % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 2446 2446 2446 2446 704 704 704 704 1182 1182 1182 1182 
The table relates a bank's economic performance to its hypothesized determinants as specified in the leftmost column. Performance is measured as return on assets 
(ROA), which we operationalize as net income after taxes divided by total assets at year end. Commercial is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a 
Commercial bank and zero otherwise. Asset risk is the fraction of assets which is not cash, claims on the central bank, loans to customers, or fixed assets. Liability 
risk is operationalized as one minus deposits divided by total assets. We assume that the lower these two measures, the smaller the risk. Bank size is the log of the 
bank's assets in constant 2002 NOK. In the Year dummies row, a yes (no) reflects that we include (do not include) a time dummy to capture time fixed effects. A 
yes (no) in the Random effects row means that we use (do not use) random effects estimation to capture firm fixed effects. We report the estimated regression 
coefficients in bold and its t-statistic in italics. The bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R2, F-value (Wald chi2 for random effects regressions) with 
corresponding p-value, and the number of observations for each regression. 
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5.4 Alternative explanations 
The surprising finding so far is the lacking support for the agency idea that economic 
performance improves as the owners’ control rights become stronger. We will analyze 
two reasons why, neither of which necessarily refutes the agency logic. First, if the 
owners are forced to be passive for exogenous reasons, the key governance 
mechanism in agency theory will be more or less blocked, and owned firms may not 
differ from ownerless firms in a governance and performance sense. Second, if firms 
are disciplined by other governance mechanisms than ownership, monitoring by 
owners may be redundant. 
5.4.1 Restrictions on ownership  
Corporate governance research has found that performance tends to improve when 
ownership rights are held directly (personally) rather than indirectly and when some 
owners have sufficiently strong incentives and power to monitor the management 
team (Becht et al, 2002). These two ownership characteristics deal with owner types 
and owner concentration, respectively. Table 16 shows the aggregate equity fraction 
per owner type in panel (a) and the fraction held by the largest and by the five largest 
owners in panel (b).  
 According to panel (a), average direct ownership is roughly 50% in PCC 
banks and 20% in commercial banks. The corresponding figure in other Norwegian 
listed firms is 18% over a similar period (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2006). This high 
incidence of direct equity holdings suggests that from an agency perspective, 
ownership has high value in banking. Therefore, being ownerless may be more of a 
problem in the banking industry than elsewhere. 
 Agency theory could make the opposite argument from the ownership 
concentration figures in panel (b), which are low by European standards and 
considerably below the typical level in other Norwegian industries, which is roughly  
a mean holding of 30% for the largest owner and 55% for the five largest (Bøhren and 
Ødegaard, 2006). This low concentration is due to regulation, which mandates special 
permission from the Ministry of finance to hold more than 10% of a bank’s equity. 
The table shows that 10% is indeed the median largest holding in a commercial bank 
over the years, reflecting a binding restriction for the typical bank in our sample. The 
mean exceeds this median because the state held very large stakes in a few banks 
around the banking crisis and still held one third of the equity in the largest 
commercial bank at the end of the sample period. 
 Because the upper bound on the largest holding is binding in the typical 
commercial bank, it follows that ownership concentration is suboptimally low. 
Nevertheless, 10% is about five times higher than the average largest holding in US 
firms, and 10% of the average commercial bank’s equity is no trivial amount in terms 
of implied monitoring incentives. For instance, 10% of equity in the largest and 
smallest commercial bank in 2002 is NOK 2.5 bill. and 0.2 bill., respectively. 
Moreover, there are no regulatory restrictions on large owners’ ability to create voting 
coalitions. Thus, we conclude that although regulation forces ownership concentration 
below its optimal level, this does not prevent owners from active monitoring. The 
potential for such activity may be suboptimal, but far from non-existent. 
5.4.2 Substitutes for ownership 
Ownership is redundant if other governance mechanisms can do the job at comparable 
costs. We consider three such substitutes for ownership functions: (i) capital 
constraints in ownerless firms, (ii) regulators in all firms, and (iii) competition in all 
firms.  
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Table 16: Ownership structure 
Panel (a): Owner types 
 Government Persons Financial Industrial International 
Year  PCC Com PCC Com PCC Com PCC Com PCC Com 
1989 3.0 0.0 30.0 23.3 37.7 29.7 13.3 28.5 14.0 16.6 
1990 3.3 0.0 28.0 25.4 42.8 31.9 13.2 24.3 10.5 16.8 
1991 2.5 3.7 30.5 26.6 48.3 20.0 11.2 35.0 5.2 12.9 
1992 2.4 10.8 38.6 24.9 35.8 25.4 18.6 28.9 2.6 8.1 
1993 12.0 17.3 37.4 22.3 25.4 25.4 18.8 23.6 4.2 9.3 
1994 6.8 13.0 33.5 21.5 28.6 21.4 25.0 32.3 4.3 9.6 
1995 5.2 12.3 43.9 21.1 16.9 21.3 29.2 24.8 2.8 18.3 
1996 2.1 11.6 50.5 19.8 13.9 26.1 27.0 21.4 4.4 19.3 
1997 2.6 11.6 52.6 19.0 13.4 25.9 25.5 22.8 3.9 18.9 
1998 2.4 11.6 50.7 18.4 19.5 23.2 22.3 21.1 3.2 23.8 
1999 2.0 16.7 55.2 22.2 15.3 23.5 20.9 22.5 4.3 13.8 
2000 2.0 15.0 55.3 24.2 15.2 29.8 20.4 21.2 5.1 8.2 
2001 2.0 12.4 54.0 24.0 15.4 30.2 19.5 21.0 6.8 10.4 
2002 1.8 13.2 55.7 24.2 16.4 24.6 19.5 22.2 4.5 13.8 
All 2.9 9.8 48.7 22.4 20.0 25.7 21.3 25.3 5.0 14.9 
           
Panel (b): Ownership concentration 
 Largest owner  Five largest owners  
 Mean Median  Mean Median  
 Year  PCC Com PCC Com  PCC Com PCC Com  
1989 18.3 11.7 9.5 10.0  36.2 33.7 27.0 31.0  
1990 9.8 14.8 9.5 13.0  31.3 34.8 31.0 32.0  
1991 20.3 14.0 12.5 11.0  39.5 41.7 33.0 43.0  
1992 10.0 22.1 11.0 17.5  29.2 47.5 33.0 43.0  
1993 16.2 23.8 7.0 11.0  31.4 42.4 25.0 34.0  
1994 11.0 19.9 6.5 11.5  26.8 39.6 23.5 32.0  
1995 8.6 19.6 6.0 13.0  20.9 35.9 19.0 28.0  
1996 6.1 18.6 4.5 10.0  15.7 37.1 13.0 32.0  
1997 4.6 17.0 4.5 10.0  13.5 40.9 14.0 44.0  
1998 4.8 16.2 5.0 10.0  15.4 37.0 15.0 39.0  
1999 6.1 15.7 6.0 9.5  16.4 36.7 18.0 31.5  
2000 7.0 16.6 7.0 10.0  17.1 38.4 17.0 28.0  
2001 7.4 16.6 8.0 10.0  18.0 36.2 18.0 32.0  
2002 7.4 16.6 8.0 10.0  19.0 37.0 19.0 28.0  
Average 8.1 17.2 6.0 10.0  20.1 38.3 18.0 35.5  
Panel (a) reports the mean, aggregate ownership fraction per firm across five owner types. 
Panel (b) shows the mean and median ownership fraction for the largest owner and for the 
five largest owners for PCC banks and commercial banks. We exclude cases where the largest 
owner holds 90% or more. 
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   The capital constraint argument is based on the fact that unlike commercial 
banks and PCC banks, non-PCC banks cannot raise outside equity. Any equity-
financed growth must come from past earnings. This apparent handicap may turn out 
to be a competitive advantage for ownerless banks, provided bank managers tend to 
overinvest in general and that owner monitoring is weak in owned banks. In such a 
setting, self-serving managers in owned banks can equity-finance overinvestment with 
both earnings and equity issues, whereas managers of ownerless banks can only use 
earnings. Therefore, the lacking outside equity option may discipline managers of 
ownerless banks in similar ways that active owners would. If this mechanism works, 
we would expect expansive non-PCC banks to finance their growth more heavily with 
debt than other banks would, particularly when the banking industry is growing fast. 
Thus, non-PCCs would be closer than other banks to the minimum equity restriction 
set by regulators. 
The start of our sample period coincides with the beginning of a deregulation 
period for the banking industry. All banks were given more flexibility and better 
growth opportunities, including the possibility to compete on interest rates. Given the 
arguments just made, we would expect non-PCC banks to be more capital constrained 
than other banks under such market conditions. The capitalization ratios in table 17 do 
not support this idea. The average capitalization ratio is 9.8% in non-PCCs and 7.1% 
in commercial banks. The difference is statistically significant in 15 out of the 18 
years, and the maximum ratio in any year is normally more than twice as large in non-
PCCs.24 Thus, because non-PCCs were further away from minimum equity 
requirements set by regulators than commercial banks and PCCs, we cannot argue that 
the inability to raise new equity disciplines ownerless non-PCCs is ways that 
substitute for owner monitoring.25 
Notice also that although the free cash flow of a non-PCC bank is 
automatically kept low because it cannot raise equity, the opposite effect comes from 
the fact that non-PCCs retain all their earnings because no stakeholder can receive 
dividends. Hence, the non-PCC is neither disciplined by dividend payments nor by the 
capital market’s scrutiny in equity flotation. Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividend 
payout and the resulting need to raise new equity for new investments are powerful 
and easily accessible corporate governance mechanisms. 
                                                 
24 We define the capital coverage ratio as equity plus subordinated debt divided by assets. The legal 
minimum capitalization ratio uses a particular weighting system for the different asset classes. Because 
we are unable to reconstruct this exactly, we use unweighted assets. However, as non-PCC are less 
risky than PCCs and commercials, they would have an even higher relative capitalization ratios if we 
were to use the correct weighting formula. The upward shift in capitalisation in 1992 and 1993 
coincides with the end of the banking crisis and the implementation of the Basel accord. The 
capitalization ratios are highest in all three bank types around 1995, moving slowly downwards 
thereafter. 
25 Notice also that the capitalisation ratios shifts upwards in 1992 and 1993. This coincides with the end 
of the banking crisis and the implementation of the Basel accord. The capitalization ratios are highest 
in all three bank types around 1995, moving slowly downwards thereafter. 
  42
 
Table 17: The capitalisation ratios across years and bank types 
 Mean 
t-statistic for 
difference in means Highest (Lowest) 
 (1) (2) (3)          
Year  Non-PCC PCC Com (1)-(2) (2)- (3) (1)-(3) Non-PCC PCC Com 
1985 6.1  5.5   1.3 14.0 (2.4)   9.2 (3.9) 
1986 5.8  6.1   -0.7 14.0 -   9.9 (3.5) 
1987 7.0  5.5   3.5* 18.3 (2.3)   8.7 (3.4) 
1988 6.8 5.8 5.0 1.3 0.6 1.8* 17.0 (-1.6) 7.2 (4.7) 7.9 (-6.8) 
1989 7.4 5.4 4.9 3.4* 0.4 1.9* 17.4 (3.3) 7.6 (2.9) 7.6 (-11.5) 
1990 7.9 4.3 5.8 2.5* -1.0 3.7* 17.5 (1.0) 7.5 (-3.5) 8.3 (2.9) 
1991 7.7 5.6 6.1 2.9* -0.6 2.6* 18.0 (-16.2) 8.7 (2.7) 9.7 (4.2) 
1992 10.7 6.7 7.6 4.0* -0.8 4.3* 19.3 (4.7) 10.4 (0.4) 12.3 (4.8) 
1993 11.5 9.1 11.3 3.6* -1.1 0.1 21.5 (6.3) 11.0 (6.1) 28.6 (5.8) 
1994 12.3 9.2 9.5 6.2* -0.5 6.9* 22.4 (5.8) 11.9 (7.7) 11.3 (8.3) 
1995 13.0 10.2 10.0 3.8* 0.3 5.1* 24.2 (6.3) 16.5 (7.4) 12.8 (8.6) 
1996 13.2 10.9 8.8 2.9* 2.5* 7.8* 26.1 (6.5) 19.1 (8.5) 10.2 (6.9) 
1997 12.9 10.9 8.9 2.2* 2.2* 7.4* 26.4 (7.3) 19.0 (7.6) 10.1 (6.8) 
1998 12.9 10.8 9.3 2.8* 1.7* 5.5* 26.0 (7.2) 18.2 (5.5) 10.9 (6.5) 
1999 12.8 10.6 8.7 3.4* 1.9* 4.6* 26.9 (8.3) 17.7 (6.7) 10.6 (6.7) 
2000 12.5 10.0 8.8 4.3* 1.2 3.9* 26.6 (7.8) 17.3 (6.3) 10.9 (6.7) 
2001 12.0 9.6 8.1 4.5* 1.7* 4.5* 26.2 (7.3) 16.1 (7.1) 9.5 (6.8) 
2002 11.5 9.2 7.7 4.4* 1.3 3.4* 26.7 (6.9) 15.9 (5.3) 8.8 (6.7) 
Average 9.8 9.4 7.1 3.5 0.7 3.8 21.6 (3.6) 13.6 (5.0) 11.0 (4.1) 
The table shows distributional characteristics of the capitalisation ratio, which we operationalize as book equity plus subordinated loans 
divided by the book value of the assets. The averages at the bottom of the table are based on the pooled sample. 
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What about the banking supervisor? This monitoring activity occurs according 
to the same, detailed rules in all banks regardless of organizational form. Therefore, it 
may be argued that a high-quality banking inspection makes owners redundant. We 
disagree because the banking inspector’s job is not to maximize the value of the bank, 
but to limit its downside risk.26 This means the existence of a banking regulator may 
explain why depositors dare to leave their money with a bank whose owners benefit 
from risk-taking. It may also explain why most banks stay out of bankruptcy. 
However, banking inspection cannot explain why a given bank or a given type of 
banks is more profitable than others. This argument is consistent with a study of 244 
banks in 44 countries, which finds no convincing relationship between bank valuation 
and the way banks are regulated and supervised by public authorities (Caprio et al, 
2003). Just like we concluded for regulatory ownership restrictions in all banks and 
the nonavailability of outside equity for non-PCC banks, we think the banking 
supervisor cannot explain why ownerless banks do so well.  
Competition is our third explanation of why ownerless firms are not 
outperformed by owned firms. The general idea is that more competition reduces 
admissible inefficiency in any enterprise, regardless of its organizational form. 
Stronger competition moves product prices closer to marginal production costs in the 
most efficient firm, making it harder for any firm to survive. Conversely, monopoly 
power enables inefficient firms to remain in the market.  
The theory of agency costs and competition shows that  unlike what was 
originally thought (Leibenstein, 1966; Machlup, 1967; Hart, 1983), more competition 
does not necessarily imply increased effort by value-maximizing firms (Scharfstein, 
1988; Schmidt, 1997). Schmidt (1997) shows that agents with firm-specific human 
capital always have stronger incentives to work harder the stronger the competition. 
This happens because more competition reduces profits, thereby increasing the 
liquidation risk and reducing the value of the agent’s firm-specific investment. 
However, because more competition produces lower product prices and thereby 
erodes the value of cost-reducing effort, it may be optimal for the principal to induce 
less effort by the agent. The net effect of these two forces is ambiguous, and the 
empirical IO literature tends to find an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
increased competition and innovation. The strongest effect of competition on 
innovative activity occurs in oligopolistic markets, such as computers and 
automobiles.  
This logic means that if competition disciplines the firm, owner monitoring 
and competition may be thought of as substitute governance mechanisms (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). Therefore, monitoring by strong, incentivized owners will only 
matter for performance when competition is low. This implies that the relationship 
between organizational form and performance is weaker the stronger the competition. 
This idea has received some support by the very limited existing evidence on this 
issue (Palmer, 1973; Masulis et al, 2005). 
We are not saying that governance quality is unimportant in competitive 
markets. Rather, we say the opposite. When competition is low, it takes active owners 
to ensure the firm has a value-maximizing governance system, such as competent 
boards and well-functioning incentive contracts with management. However, the firm 
may survive even if such owner qualities are missing. In contrast, firms facing strong 
competition go bankrupt unless they have installed value-maximizing governance 
                                                 
26 The Norwegian Financial Supervisory Authority states that its main purpose is ‘to ensure that 
financial enterprises and markets function securely and efficiently in the best interest of society and 
users of financial services…’ (Kredittilsynet, 2002). 
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systems. If they have weak or even no owners, the competitive pressure and the 
agents’ incentives to survive jointly create the urge to establish value-maximizing 
governance systems. So, governance (including ownership structure) and performance 
are unrelated when competition is strong because all firms have optimal governance 
installed. In contrast, governance and performance are systematically related when 
competition is weak because not every firm needs optimal governance to survive 
(Demsetz, 1983).  
Competitive pressure may come from the firm’s product market, labor market, 
and the market for corporate control. The latter market cannot explain our finding, as 
the most efficient organizational type (non-PCC banks) cannot be traded. We doubt 
that labor market competition does the job, since unemployment was only 4.2% on 
average and never exceeded 6.0% in the sample period.27 However, since the local 
demand for management in financial institutions in smaller locations may be thin, 
managers of savings banks in particular may be disciplined by potential loss of firm-
specific human capital if the bank is underperforming. 
This leaves us with product market competition as the premier candidate for 
rationalizing our results.. To substantiate this explanation, notice first that all banks in 
our sample have access to the same product market, and that there are no major 
economic or regulatory barriers to entry. Second, product market competition in 
Norwegian banks seems relatively strong internationally. Table 18 shows market 
concentration in banking across 16 European countries from 1990 to 2002. We 
measure market concentration as total assets in the five largest banks divided by total 
assets in all banks. 
 
Table 18: Market concentration in European banking 1990-2002 
Country 1990 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Average 
Austria 35 44 42 41 43 45 46 42 
Belgium  48 54 63 76 75 78 82 68 
Denmark 76 70 71 71 60 68 68 69 
Finland 53 88 86 86 87 80 79 80 
France 42 40 41 43 47 47 45 43 
Germany 14 17 19 19 20 20 20 18 
Greece 83 56 63 67 65 67 67 67 
Ireland 44 41 40 41 41 43 46 42 
Italy 19 25 25 26 23 29 31 25 
Luxembourg  23 25 26 26 28 30 26 
Netherlands 73 79 82 82 81 83 83 80 
Norway 68 51 50 55 52 50 50 54 
Portugal 58 46 45 44 59 60 60 53 
Spain 35 32 35 41 46 45 44 40 
Sweden  58 56 56 57 55 56 56 
UK   24 25 28 28 29 30 27 
Average 50 47 48 50 51 52 52 49 
Market concentration is measured as total assets for the five largest banks divided 
by total assets for all banks. Source: Central Bank of Norway. 
                                                 
27 Source: Statistics Norway. 
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The table documents large variations in competitive pressure across countries. 
For instance, concentration is very high in Finland and the Netherlands, where the five 
largest banks control 80% of the banking assets. At the opposite extreme of low 
concentration, Italy has 25% and Germany has 18%. Market concentration in 
Norwegian banks is medium in a European context and consistently lower than in 
other Scandinavian countries. Moreover, whereas average concentration across all 
countries has stayed quite constant over time, concentration in Norwegian banking 
drops in the early part of the period and stays close to the average European level 
thereafter. 
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6. Summary and conclusions 
Economists tend to take for granted that when ownership is separated from control, 
monitoring by those who own the capital invested will change the firm’s behavior and 
improve its performance. Similarly, we seldom question the conventional wisdom that 
stockholders will lose wealth if they internalize welfare effects of their actions on 
other stakeholders, such as employees and customers. This paper challenges these two 
ideas by analyzing empirically how firms with widely different stakeholder structures 
choose their assets and liabilities and how they perform economically under different 
market conditions. In particular, we explore whether ownership is critical for 
governance by comparing ownerless firms with multiple objectives to profit-
maximizing firms owned by stockholders. 
Our results show that firm behavior differs across organizational forms in 
ways predicted by a stakeholder theory of decision-making under asymmetric 
information. In particular, the stronger the control rights of the owners, the larger and 
riskier the firm. This is consistent with findings on depositor-owned S&Ls vs. 
stockholder-owned commercial banks in the US. 
 In contrast, we find no support for the agency idea that economic performance 
is better the stronger the control rights of capital providers and the more profit-
oriented the firm’s objective function. After having accounted for differences in risk, 
size, fixed firm effects, and fixed industry effects, ownerless firms perform better in 
crisis times and as well in normal times as firms partially or fully controlled by 
owners. A study of governance activity in Spanish banks over roughly the same 
period provides some support to our result, as average ROA was higher in ownerless 
banks than in stockholder-owned commercial banks (Crespi et al, 2004, table 2).  
Nevertheless, these results do not necessarily falsify the agency prediction that 
owners who monitor actively create economic value. Neither do they imply that 
because other disciplining mechanisms than ownership can do the job as efficiently in 
ownerless firms, owners are redundant in owned firms. The fact that both 
organizational forms have coexisted in our sample over many years supports this 
argument. It may reflect Hansmann’s (1996) insight that whether or not ownership is 
the superior organizational form is determined by characteristics of the stakeholder 
structure and the product market. Therefore, these characteristics determine whether 
control rights and cash flow rights should be put in the hands of stockholders, other 
stakeholders, or some combination of the two.  
Economic theory would argue that regardless of industry and regardless of 
stakeholder structure, firms with potential agency problems may survive if there is 
sufficient disciplining pressure from other sources than ownership. In particular, 
ownerless firms may be disciplined by mechanisms that are viable alternatives to the 
lacking monitoring by owners. We find no convincing evidence that this substitute 
role is played neither by regulation nor by the non-availability of outside equity-
financing for ownerless banks. Our evidence suggests that consistent with theoretical 
predictions (Schmidt, 1997), product market competition and the threat of lost human 
capital under bad performance jointly force ownerless firms to establish optimal 
corporate governance systems. Ownership is not critical for performance when 
competition is strong. 
If the agency problem is taken care of by substitutes for ownership, what 
remains to rationalize is why the multiple-objective firms in our sample are not losing 
out to firms with profit maximization as their only goal. Our findings support Allen et 
al. (2006) on this point, who predict that profits may increase when the firm adopts a 
multi-dimensional objective function that recognizes the interests of several 
stakeholders. This suggests corporate governance research may benefit from 
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reconsidering the conventional wisdom on the role of stakeholders in general and 
stockholders in particular. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Equally weighted asset structure  
 Fixed assets 
Downpayment 
contracts Short-term assets
Overdraft 
facilities Building loans Other loans Losses 
Year  
Non-
PCC PCC Com 
Non-
PCC PCC Com
Non-
PCC PCC Com
Non-
PCC PCC Com
Non-
PCC PCC Com
Non-
PCC PCC Com 
Non-
PCC PCC Com
1985 2.7  2.7 54.5  0.7 32.7  25.2 6.7  13.2 5.8  4.6 -  55.9 -2.5  -2.3 
1986 2.9  2.9 60.1  18.0 27.1  20.9 7.4  13.0 5.2  4.5 -  42.9 -2.7  -2.2 
1987 2.9  2.5 64.0  36.5 23.0  21.6 7.6  12.1 5.4  3.9 0.0  24.8 -2.9  -1.5 
1988 2.9 2.5 3.0 57.0 63.7 35.9 23.7 20.9 20.4 7.6 7.8 10.6 4.7 6.6 3.8 6.9 0.1 28.0 -2.8 -1.6 -1.7 
1989 3.0 3.0 3.4 59.2 68.2 42.7 23.6 15.6 20.5 7.1 8.4 8.6 3.7 5.0 2.6 6.4 2.0 23.7 -2.8 -2.1 -1.5 
1990 2.7 2.9 3.1 66.4 75.0 43.2 22.7 13.9 16.7 6.7 7.0 5.7 2.9 3.0 1.8 1.4 - 31.0 -2.8 -1.8 -1.5 
1991 2.6 2.8 3.2 67.1 77.1 41.0 23.2 12.4 15.4 6.2 7.0 4.8 2.1 2.4 1.3 1.7 0.0 36.1 -2.7 -1.6 -1.7 
1992 2.4 2.6 3.3 69.9 80.0 63.8 22.0 13.3 17.7 5.9 7.6 5.8 1.6 2.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 12.0 -1.8 -5.4 -3.7 
1993 2.2 2.6 3.1 72.3 80.6 67.1 20.1 13.5 16.9 5.3 5.9 3.9 2.1 1.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 12.9 -2.0 -4.3 -4.7 
1994 6.4 3.4 2.7 72.3 81.2 56.2 14.6 11.5 14.8 5.1 4.9 4.1 1.6 2.1 0.8 2.0 0.0 24.3 -1.8 -3.2 -3.0 
1995 1.9 2.5 2.2 74.7 81.1 61.8 18.1 11.4 13.9 5.2 5.1 5.2 1.8 2.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 17.9 -1.8 -2.2 -2.3 
1996 1.8 2.2 1.9 76.4 79.6 63.2 16.5 13.1 13.6 5.0 4.5 5.6 1.8 2.1 1.3 0.0 0.0 16.1 -1.6 -1.6 -1.7 
1997 1.7 1.9 1.6 78.8 79.4 58.4 14.3 13.3 14.1 4.6 4.7 7.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 18.3 -1.4 -1.3 -1.4 
1998 1.6 1.9 1.5 79.7 80.1 48.4 13.6 12.3 14.1 4.5 4.7 4.5 1.9 2.2 2.0 0.0 0.0 30.9 -1.4 -1.2 -1.4 
1999 1.5 1.8 1.8 80.4 79.8 43.3 13.5 13.0 18.1 4.2 4.4 4.3 1.7 2.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 32.4 -1.4 -1.1 -0.9 
2000 1.5 1.7 1.6 81.1 79.8 69.2 13.4 13.0 16.8 3.9 4.2 4.8 1.5 2.4 1.1 0.0 0.1 7.3 -1.5 -1.1 -0.9 
2001 1.4 1.8 1.3 81.9 80.4 78.2 12.7 11.9 13.9 3.8 4.7 4.0 1.7 2.3 1.6 0.0 0.0 1.7 -1.5 -1.1 -0.7 
2002 1.4 1.5 1.4 83.0 80.6 78.4 12.1 12.5 15.6 3.5 4.4 3.1 1.6 2.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.6 -1.5 -1.4 -0.6 
Average 2.4 2.3 2.4 71.0 77.8 50.3 19.3 13.4 17.2 5.6 5.7 6.7 2.7 2.7 2.0 1.0 0.2 23.2 -2.0 -2.1 -1.9 
All figures are reported as percent of total assets. The total average weights the years equally. Fixed assets are buildings and investments in affiliated 
companies. Short-term assets are cash, cash equivalents and securities held for trading. Downpayment contracts are loans that are amortized (gradual 
repayment of the principal), e.g. mortgages. Overdraft facilities are trade credits and other fixed limit loans. Building loans are fixed limit loans. Other 
loans include all other loans, e.g. credit card debt and leasing. Losses are allowances for losses on all loan portfolios. 
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Table A2: Equally weighted liability structure  
 Equity Subordinated debt Due to customers Due to banks Other liabilities 
Year 
Non-
PCC PCC Com 
Non-
PCC PCC Com 
Non-
PCC PCC Com 
Non-
PCC PCC Com 
Non-
PCC PCC Com 
1985 6.1  5.1 0.0  1.2 86.8  64.5 3.9  16.2 3.1  13.0 
1986 5.8  5.7 0.0  1.4 83.2  49.1 7.4  24.0 3.5  19.8 
1987 7.0  4.6 0.0  1.7 80.7  47.3 9.9  22.7 2.5  23.6 
1988 6.8 3.8 3.4 0.0 2.0 2.2 79.7 61.6 42.8 10.8 24.6 23.8 2.7 8.0 27.8 
1989 7.3 4.3 2.8 0.1 1.1 2.8 81.8 65.4 44.1 8.6 21.9 21.6 2.2 7.3 28.8 
1990 7.7 3.3 4.0 0.1 1.0 2.2 83.8 69.8 38.2 6.2 17.0 19.2 2.1 8.9 36.3 
1991 7.6 3.9 3.1 0.1 1.8 3.3 84.6 72.9 37.7 5.7 13.7 14.5 2.0 7.7 41.4 
1992 10.6 4.5 4.4 0.1 2.2 3.3 83.2 79.0 42.2 4.3 9.3 13.9 1.7 5.0 36.2 
1993 11.4 6.6 6.7 0.1 2.5 4.7 83.4 76.5 40.0 3.1 8.3 11.7 1.9 6.1 36.8 
1994 12.1 7.1 6.7 0.1 2.2 2.8 82.4 75.5 44.7 3.3 5.1 11.3 2.0 10.1 34.6 
1995 12.9 8.7 7.2 0.1 1.4 2.8 82.3 73.1 47.3 2.7 6.1 11.1 1.9 10.6 31.6 
1996 13.2 9.4 6.2 0.0 1.5 2.6 81.4 70.9 42.7 3.1 5.3 13.1 2.2 12.9 35.4 
1997 12.9 9.3 5.8 0.0 1.6 3.1 79.2 66.4 43.4 4.4 6.5 16.2 3.5 16.2 31.5 
1998 12.8 9.7 6.3 0.0 1.1 3.0 77.8 65.7 41.8 5.2 8.0 14.9 4.1 15.6 34.0 
1999 12.8 9.5 6.4 0.0 1.0 2.3 76.3 63.6 41.4 6.4 9.3 13.1 4.5 16.5 36.8 
2000 12.4 8.8 6.3 0.1 1.2 2.4 74.6 62.0 41.3 5.6 8.5 14.0 7.4 19.5 35.9 
2001 11.8 8.2 6.0 0.1 1.5 2.1 73.9 58.6 41.4 5.5 9.1 13.2 8.6 22.6 37.3 
2002 11.2 7.5 6.0 0.3 1.6 1.7 73.6 59.4 45.4 4.9 7.5 7.7 10.0 24.0 39.1 
Average 10.1 7.0 5.4 0.1 1.6 2.5 80.5 68.0 44.2 5.6 10.7 15.7 3.7 12.7 32.2 
All figures are reported as percent of total assets. The total average weights the years equally. Subordinated debt includes debt that can be regarded as 
capital for capital requirement calculations. Due to customers includes regular deposits from customers. Due to banks is inter-bank loans including loans 
from the central bank. Other liabilities includes securities issued. 
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Table A3: The interest rate margin  
 Mean 
t-statistic for difference  
in means  
 1 2 3      
Year Non-PCC PCC Com 1-2  2-3   1-3  
1985 4.1  3.0  5.19 * 
1986 4.4  3.1  6.42 * 
1987 4.6  2.8  7.30 * 
1988 4.4 3.7 2.7 1.98 * 1.94 * 6.33 * 
1989 4.8 4.4 2.9 2.18 * 3.94 * 5.88 * 
1990 4.7 4.3 2.1 1.55 * 6.55 * 9.43 * 
1991 4.5 4.3 2.1 0.75 5.83 * 8.61 * 
1992 4.7 4.5 2.2 0.85 5.99 * 8.23 * 
1993 4.7 4.8 2.5 -0.91 6.29 * 6.38 * 
1994 4.4 4.2 2.3 1.36 5.59 * 6.47 * 
1995 4.0 3.5 2.2 2.50 * 3.36 * 5.87 * 
1996 3.7 3.3 1.9 3.66 * 5.80 * 7.54 * 
1997 3.4 3.0 2.0 3.58 * 5.00 * 7.11 * 
1998 3.4 3.1 2.1 2.50 * 4.32 * 5.88 * 
1999 3.4 3.1 1.8 2.56 * 4.70 * 6.41 * 
2000 3.2 2.8 1.8 3.27 * 4.28 * 6.48 * 
2001 3.1 2.7 1.9 2.62 * 2.55 * 3.82 * 
2002 3.0 2.6 1.7 2.92 * 1.93 * 2.88 * 
Average 4.1 3.3 2.5 2.09 * 4.54 * 6.46 * 
 
The table reports the equally weighted interest rate margin for the population of 
Norwegian banks. The interest rate margin is defined as net interest income over 
total assets. t-values marked with a * reflects a difference between two means which 
is statistically different from zero at the 5% level. Non-PCC banks are ownerless 
foundations (pure savings banks). PCC banks used to be pure savings banks that 
later transformed themselves into PCC banks by issuing equity securities to the 
general public in terms of  Primary Capital Certificates (PCC).  
 
  II
 
Table A4: The profit margin  
 Mean 
t-statistic for difference  
in means  
 1 2 3      
Year Non-PCC PCC Com 1-2  2-3   1-3  
1985 3.7  3.0  1.68 * 
1986 3.6  2.6  2.19 * 
1987 3.9  0.6  3.96 * 
1988 2.8 -0.9 -5.8 3.45 * 1.03  1.84 * 
1989 4.6 -1.1 -2.5 2.54 * 0.25  1.40  
1990 3.8 -6.2 -0.9 1.43 -0.72  1.96 * 
1991 3.0 -8.2 -14.0 2.16 * 0.73  2.66 * 
1992 21.9 0.4 -5.4 3.02 * 0.63  4.46 * 
1993 12.8 13.0 8.4 -0.10 1.82  3.85 * 
1994 13.9 11.8 10.8 1.45 0.38  1.29  
1995 15.7 3.4 14.0 1.28 -1.05  0.61  
1996 8.9 7.0 11.9 1.05 -1.23  -0.83  
1997 16.2 12.8 15.8 1.41 -1.03  0.19  
1998 11.5 11.2 9.6 0.27 1.18  1.83 * 
1999 13.4 12.8 12.2 0.50 0.36  0.75  
2000 14.3 12.4 11.6 1.87 0.53  2.01  
2001 9.0 8.0 10.4 0.96 -1.32  -0.85  
2002 6.6 2.9 8.5 1.58 -2.43 * -2.19 * 
Average 8.9 7.3 2.8 1.53  -0.06   1.49  
 
The table reports the equally weighted profit margin for the population of 
Norwegian banks. The profit margin is defined as net income over total income. t-
values marked with a * reflects a difference between two means which is 
statistically different from zero at the 5% level. Non-PCC banks are ownerless 
foundations (pure savings banks). PCC banks used to be pure savings banks that 
later transformed themselves into PCC banks by issuing equity securities to the 
general public in terms of  Primary Capital Certificates (PCC).  
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Table A5: The gross return on assets  
 Mean 
t-statistic for difference  
in means  
 1 2 3      
Year Non-PCC PCC Com 1-2  2-3   1-3  
1985 5.7  6.0   -1.81 * 
1986 6.4  6.8   -1.39  
1987 7.3  6.7   2.59 * 
1988 7.3 7.4 6.8 -0.23 0.67  0.63  
1989 6.9 6.7 6.4 0.66 0.39  0.58  
1990 6.4 5.4 6.5 1.08 -1.13  -0.35  
1991 5.9 5.0 5.4 1.55 -0.37  0.48  
1992 7.8 5.7 6.1 2.72 * -0.37  1.88 * 
1993 5.4 5.7 6.4 -0.92 -1.05  -1.62  
1994 3.7 3.7 4.9 -0.03 -2.97 * -3.13 * 
1995 3.8 3.4 5.1 0.89 -3.44 * -5.35 * 
1996 3.0 2.9 4.3 0.77 -3.49 * -3.73 * 
1997 2.9 2.6 3.8 1.03 -4.57 * -6.77 * 
1998 3.3 3.4 4.3 -0.26 -4.09 * -5.39 * 
1999 4.2 4.1 4.6 0.06 -1.23  -1.34  
2000 4.1 4.1 4.7 0.14 -3.68 * -5.71 * 
2001 4.3 4.3 5.0 -0.22 -2.84 * -3.67 * 
2002 4.0 3.9 4.3 0.63 -0.65  -0.47  
Average 5.3 4.1 5.8 0.53  -1.92 * -1.92 * 
 
The table reports the equally weighted gross return on assets (gross ROA) for the 
population of Norwegian banks. Gross ROA is defined as net income plus tax-
adjusted interest rate costs over total assets.. t-values marked with a * reflects a 
difference between two means which is statistically different from zero at the 5% 
level. Non-PCC banks are ownerless foundations (pure savings banks). PCC banks 
used to be pure savings banks that later transformed themselves into PCC banks by 
issuing equity securities to the general public in terms of  Primary Capital Certificates 
(PCC).  
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Table A6: The return on equity  
 Mean 
t-statistic for difference  
in means  
 1 2 3     
Year Non-PCC PCC Com 1-2  2-3  1-3  
1985 6.8  8.8 -1.66  
1986 8.2  8.3 -0.07  
1987 7.5  -0.3 2.15 * 
1988 7.1 -4.6 4.7 2.46 * -0.79 0.22  
1989 8.3 -4.8 11.0 1.80 * -1.78 * -0.52  
1990 3.2 31.1 -46.1 -0.91 1.42 1.10  
1991 5.4 -71.2 -125.5 1.67 0.56 1.54  
1992 24.6 -164.5 -142.8 1.07 -0.11 1.74 * 
1993 13.0 25.2 16.6 -2.25 * 1.50 -1.75 * 
1994 9.7 14.9 14.8 -2.35 * 0.02 -1.54  
1995 10.2 11.6 16.8 -0.47 -1.10 -1.85 * 
1996 5.2 7.2 14.3 -1.59 -1.62 -2.13 * 
1997 8.6 10.3 17.8 -1.12 -2.69 * -3.94 * 
1998 6.7 9.0 11.8 -2.17 * -1.56 -3.46 * 
1999 9.0 12.1 14.3 -3.00 * -1.21 -3.47 * 
2000 9.8 12.0 14.3 -2.04 * -1.43 -3.86 * 
2001 6.4 8.1 14.0 -1.35 -3.79 * -7.63 * 
2002 4.3 1.1 10.7 0.80 -2.26 * -3.41 * 
Average 8.5 -0.5 -12.1 -0.63  -0.99  -1.59  
 
The table reports the equally weighted return on equity for the population of Norwegian 
banks. The return on equity is defined as net income divided by total equity. t-values 
marked with a * reflects a difference between two means which is statistically different 
from zero at the 5% level. Non-PCC banks are ownerless foundations (pure savings 
banks). PCC banks used to be pure savings banks that later transformed themselves into 
PCC banks by issuing equity securities to the general public in terms of  Primary Capital 
Certificates (PCC).  
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